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ABSTRACT 
  Choice can be an extraordinary benefit or an immense burden. In 
some contexts, people choose not to choose, or would do so if they 
were asked. In part because of limitations of “bandwidth,” and in part 
because of awareness of their own lack of information and potential 
biases, people sometimes want other people to choose for them. For 
example, many people prefer not to make choices about their health 
or retirement plans; they want to delegate those choices to a private or 
public institution that they trust (and may well be willing to pay a 
considerable amount to those who are willing to accept such 
delegations). This point suggests that however well accepted, the line 
between active choosing and paternalism is often illusory. When 
private or public institutions override people’s desire not to choose 
and insist on active choosing, they may well be behaving 
paternalistically, through a form of choice-requiring paternalism. 
Active choosing can be seen as a form of libertarian paternalism, and 
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a frequently attractive one, if people are permitted to opt out of 
choosing in favor of a default (and in that sense permitted not to 
choose); it is a form of nonlibertarian paternalism insofar as people 
are required to choose. For both ordinary people and private or 
public institutions, the ultimate judgment in favor of active choosing, 
or in favor of choosing not to choose, depends largely on the costs of 
decisions and the costs of errors. 
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I.  RESPECTING CHOICE 
Consider the following problems: 
  1. Public officials are deciding whether to require people, as a 
condition for obtaining a driver’s license, to make an active choice 
about whether they want to become organ donors. The alternatives 
are to continue with the existing opt-in system, in which people 
become organ donors only if they affirmatively indicate their 
consent, or to change to an opt-out system, in which consent is 
presumed. 
  2. A private company is deciding among three options: to enroll 
people automatically in a health-insurance plan; to make them opt 
in if they like; or to say that as a condition for starting work, they 
must indicate whether they want health insurance, and if so, which 
plan they want. 
  3. A utility company is deciding whether to adopt for consumers 
a “green default,” with a somewhat more expensive but 
environmentally preferable energy source, or instead a “gray 
default,” with a somewhat less expensive but environmentally less 
desirable energy source, or alternatively to ask consumers which 
energy source they prefer. 
  4. A social-networking site is deciding whether to adopt a system 
of default settings for privacy, or instead to require first-time users 
to specify, as a condition for using the site, which privacy settings 
they prefer. 
  5. A state is contemplating a method of making voting more 
automatic, by allowing people to visit a website, at any time, to 
indicate that they want to vote for all candidates from one or the 
other party, and even to say, if they wish, that they would like to 
continue voting for such candidates until they explicitly indicate 
otherwise. 
  6. An online bookseller has compiled a great deal of information 
about the choices of its customers, and in some cases, it believes that 
it knows what people want before they know themselves. It is 
contemplating a system of “predictive shopping,” in which it sends 
people certain books, and charges their credit cards, before they 
make their wishes known. It is also considering whether to ask 
people to make an active choice to enroll in a system of predictive 
shopping, or instead to enroll them automatically. 
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In these cases, and countless others, an institution is deciding 
whether to use some kind of default rule or instead to require some 
kind of active choice. (I shall say a good deal about what the word 
“require” might mean in this setting.) Default rules tend to be 
“sticky,” and can therefore greatly influence ultimate outcomes; for 
this reason, they might seem to be a form of objectionable 
paternalism. For those who reject paternalism and who prize 
freedom of choice, active choosing has evident appeal. Indeed, it 
might seem far preferable to any kind of default rule. 
In recent years, there have been vigorous debates about 
freedom of choice, paternalism, behavioral economics, individual 
autonomy, and the use of defaults.1 Invoking recent behavioral 
findings, some people have argued that because human beings err in 
predictable ways, some kind of paternalism is newly justified, 
especially if it preserves freedom of choice, as captured in the idea 
of “libertarian paternalism.”2 Others contend that because of those 
very errors, some form of coercion is required to promote people’s 
 
 1. See, e.g., SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM 
1–7 (2012) (offering a defense of paternalistic policies with reference to behavioral economics 
and social psychology); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT WEALTH, HEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 9–11 (2008) (discussing misconceptions 
about paternalism and arguing for a form of libertarian paternalism); Ryan Bubb & Richard 
Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1597–
1600 (2014) (illustrating the impact of behavioral law and economics—as applied social science 
and politics—on freedom of choice); Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, 
Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and 
the Case for Asymmetric Paternalism, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2003) (introducing the 
notion of “asymmetric paternalism” as a criterion for evaluating paternalistic regulations and 
doctrines); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its 
Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1075–80 (2012) 
(arguing that behavioral law and economics “put[s] us on a slippery slope” and poses a 
significant threat to liberty and individual autonomy); Riccardo Rebonato, A Critical 
Assessment of Libertarian Paternalism, 37 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 357, 362–69 (2014) (exploring 
the philosophical roots of libertarian paternalism and proposing interventions aimed at 
improving human cognitive abilities); see generally RICCARDO REBONATO, TAKING LIBERTIES: 
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM (2012) (objecting to paternalism 
even if it respects freedom of choice). 
 2. See, e.g., Camerer et al., supra note 1, at 1224–50 (evaluating paternalistic regulations 
and policies using behavioral economics); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian 
Paternalism Is Not An Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1160–63 (2003) (arguing that it is 
possible as well as desirable for private and public institutions to influence behavior while also 
respecting freedom of choice). 
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welfare, and that the argument for choice-denying or nonlibertarian 
paternalism is much strengthened.3 
At the same time, there have been serious objections to those 
who invoke behavioral findings to justify paternalism. A plausible 
objection is that public officials are prone to error as well, and hence 
an understanding of behavioral biases argues against paternalism, 
not in favor of it.4 The “knowledge problem” potentially affects all 
decisions by government,5 and behavioral findings seem to 
compound that problem, because they suggest that identifiable 
biases will accompany (and aggravate) sheer ignorance. The 
emerging field of “behavioral public choice” draws attention to that 
possibility.6 It might also be objected that on grounds of both 
welfare and autonomy, active choosing is desirable even if people 
have a tendency to err.7 On one view, people should be asked or 
allowed to choose, whether or not they would choose rightly; 
perhaps that approach preserves their freedom and recognizes their 
dignity. For all sides, the opposition between paternalism and active 
choosing seems stark and plain, and indeed it helps to define all of 
the existing divisions. 
My main goal here is to unsettle that opposition and to suggest 
that it is often illusory. In many contexts, an insistence on active 
choosing should be seen as a form of paternalism rather than as an 
alternative to it. Some people choose not to choose.8 Sometimes 
 
 3. See, e.g., CONLY, supra note 1, at 7 (contending that paternalism is justified in many 
cases where humans are not fully rational and simple care and introspection are ineffective); 
Bubb & Pildes, supra note 1, at 1597–98 (arguing that choice-preserving policies do not always 
promote welfare). 
 4. See Edward Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 134–35 
(2006) (“Over and over again, paternalism has been abused by governments responding to 
special interests or seeking to aggrandize their own authority.”). 
 5. Friedrich Hayek, The Uses of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519–20 
(1945) (explaining that the economic data for a whole society are never given “in [their] 
totality” to a single person). 
 6. See Jan Schnellenbach & Christian Schubert, Behavioral Public Choice: A Survey 35 
(2014) (unpublished working paper) (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2390290) (noting that there are “problems in the process of policy-making that cast serious 
doubt on the capacity of the government to accomplish systematic improvements of seemingly 
imperfect individual decisions”). 
 7. See Wright and Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1072 (arguing that “if individuals are to 
realize their full potential as participants in the political and economic life of society, then they 
must be free to err in large ways as well as small”). 
 8. An important clarification: my focus throughout is not on “not choosing,” which 
involves no choice at all, and which is different from choosing not to choose, in the sense of 
choosing someone else to choose on one’s behalf. One might not choose because of 
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they make that choice explicitly (and indeed are willing to pay a 
considerable amount to people who will choose for them). Such 
people have actively chosen not to choose. Other people make no 
explicit choice; they do not actively choose anything. But it is 
nonetheless reasonable to infer that, in particular contexts, their 
preference is not to choose, and that they would say so if asked. 
They might fear that they will err. They might be aware of their own 
lack of information9 or perhaps their own behavioral biases (such as 
unrealistic optimism10). They might find the underlying questions 
confusing, difficult, painful, and troublesome—empirically, morally, 
or otherwise. They might not enjoy choosing. They might be busy 
and lack “bandwidth,”11 and hence might want to devote scarce 
cognitive resources to other matters. They might not have a 
preference at all, and they might not want to take the trouble to try 
to form one. They might not want to take responsibility for 
potentially bad outcomes for themselves (and at least indirectly for 
others).12 They might anticipate their own regret and seek to avoid 
 
procrastination, for example, or because one wants to retain option value. See Ziv Carmon, 
Klaus Wertenbroch & Marcel Zeelenberg, Option Attachment: When Deliberating Makes 
Choosing Feel Like Losing, 30 J. CONSUMER RES. 15, 15 (2003) (discussing how consumer 
deliberation can cause consumers to experience discomfort because they experience option 
attachment). There is, of course, an overlap between the two phenomena: people might decline 
to choose because they are busy, do not want to take responsibility, or think that they might err. 
But choosing not to choose is a form of choice, and those who want to avoid choosing might be 
as averse to that choice as to any other. 
 9. On the effects of lack of information in producing abstention, see Tom Coupe & Abdul 
G. Noury, Choosing Not to Choose: On the Link Between Information and Abstention, 84 ECON. 
LETTERS 261, 264–65 (2004). 
 10. See generally TALI SHAROT, THE OPTIMISM BIAS: A TOUR OF THE IRRATIONALLY 
POSITIVE BRAIN (2011) (investigating the optimism bias and discussing how unrealistic 
optimism is generated). 
 11. See SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY 39–66 (2013) (describing 
how scarcity reduces “bandwidth” by limiting cognitive capacity and diminishing executive 
control). 
 12. For a demonstration, see Björn Bartling & Urs Fischbacher, Shifting the Blame: On 
Delegation and Responsibility, 79 REV. ECON. STUD. 67, 69 (2012). For an important and 
relevant discussion of people’s preference for flipping a coin as a way of avoiding responsibility, 
see Nadja Dwengler, Dorothea Kübler & Georg Weizsäcker, Flipping A Coin: Theory and 
Evidence, 34–35 (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2353282). Consider 
this suggestion:  
[The] cognitive or emotional cost of deciding may outweigh the benefits that arise 
from making the optimal choice. For example, the decision-maker may prefer not to 
make a choice without having sufficient time and energy to think it through. Or, she 
may not feel entitled to make it. Or, she may anticipate a possible disappointment 
about her choice that can arise after a subsequent resolution of uncertainty. Waiving 
some or all of the decision right may seem desirable in such circumstances even 
though it typically increases the chance of a suboptimal outcome.  
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it.13 To take just one example, many patients do not want to make, 
or even to participate in, their own medical decisions, and doctors 
systematically overestimate their patients’ desire to do so.14 
But even when people prefer not to choose, many private and 
public institutions favor and promote active choosing on the ground 
that it is preferable for people to choose. For example, many doctors 
expect or ask patients to choose,15 and some states require people to 
indicate their preferences with respect to organ donation at the time 
they receive their driver’s licenses. To the extent that people are 
being asked to choose when they would prefer not to do so, active 
choosing counts as paternalistic. To be sure, nanny states forbid 
choosing, but they also forbid the choice not to choose. Choice-
requiring paternalism might be an attractive form of paternalism, but 
it is no oxymoron, and it is paternalistic nonetheless. 
We shall see that in many cases, those who favor active 
choosing are actually mandating it, and may therefore be overriding 
(on paternalistic grounds) people’s choice not to choose.16 When 
people prefer not to choose, required choosing is paternalistic and a 
form of coercion.17 It may nonetheless be the right form, at least 
when active choosing does not increase the likelihood and 
magnitude of errors, and when it is important to enable people to 
learn and to develop their own preferences. 
If, by contrast, people are asked whether they want to choose, 
and can opt out of active choosing (in favor of, say, a default rule), 
 
Id. at 1. 
 13. Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 
ORG. 39, 51–54 (1980). 
 14. See CARL SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND 
MEDICAL DECISIONS 36–46 (1998). 
 15. See id.  
 16. There is an irony here in light of evidence that people sometimes place an excessive 
value on choice, in the sense that their preference for choice leads to welfare losses. See Simona 
Botti & Christopher Hsee, Dazed and Confused by Choice: How the Temporal Costs of Choice 
Freedom Lead to Undesirable Outcomes, 112 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 161, 
161 (2010) (“[D]ecision makers insist on exercising their choice opportunities even when these 
opportunities lead to poor outcomes.”).  
 17. We could also imagine situations in which people are effectively prompted to choose, 
by being explicitly asked whether they would like to do so, without in any sense being required 
to choose. For an interesting empirical result, see generally Judd B. Kessler and Alvin E. Roth, 
Don’t Take ‘No’ For An Answer: An Experiment With Actual Organ Donor Registrations 
(Aug. 2014) (unpublished working paper) (http://www.nber.org/papers/w20378) (finding that 
required active choosing has a smaller effect, in terms of getting people to sign up for organ 
donation, than prompted choice). 
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active choosing counts as a form of libertarian paternalism. In some 
cases, it is an especially attractive form. A company might ask 
people whether they want to choose the privacy settings on their 
computer, or instead rely on the default, or whether they want to 
choose their electricity supplier, or instead rely on the default. 
With such an approach, people are being asked to make an 
active choice between the default and their own preference, and in 
that sense, their liberty is fully preserved. Call this simplified active 
choosing. Simplified active choosing has the important advantage of 
avoiding the kinds of pressure that come from a default rule18 while 
also allowing people to rely on such a rule if they like. In the future, 
we should see, and we should hope to see, adoption of this approach 
by a large number of institutions, both public and private. For health 
insurance or protection of privacy, simplified active choosing has 
evident appeal. 
It is important to acknowledge, however, that whenever a 
private or public institution asks people to choose, it might be 
overriding their preference not to do so, and in that sense engaging 
in choice-requiring paternalism. This point applies even when people 
are being asked whether they want to choose to choose. After all, 
they might not want to make that second-order choice (and might 
therefore prefer a simple default rule). Questions can be annoying, 
and can take up “bandwidth,” and when people are asked any 
question at all, they might not welcome the intrusion. Private and 
public institutions might favor active choosing for honorable 
reasons, but when they ask people whether they want to choose, 
they may well be asking an unwelcome question. In this sense, there 
is a strong nonlibertarian dimension to apparently liberty-preserving 
approaches that ask people to choose between active choosing and a 
default rule. If these claims do not seem self-evident, or if they 
appear a bit jarring, it is because the idea of active choosing is so 
familiar, and so obviously appealing, that it may not be seen for 
what it is: a form of choice architecture, and one that many choosers 
may dislike, at least in settings that are unfamiliar or difficult.19 
 
 18. See Eric J. Johnson & Daniel G. Goldstein, Decisions by Default, in THE BEHAVIORAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY 417, 417–18 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013) (discussing the impact of 
defaults). 
 19. A valuable discussion is presented in Barbara Fried, But Seriously, Folks, What Do 
People Want?, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1529 (2013). 
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I also aim to show that whether or not people should favor 
active choosing, or should instead choose not to choose, depends on 
a set of identifiable questions, generally involving the costs of 
decisions and the costs of errors (understood as the number and 
magnitude of mistakes).20 If, for example, private or public 
institutions lack relevant knowledge, are self-interested, or are 
subject to the pressures imposed by self-interested private groups, 
there is a strong argument for active choosing, because that 
approach will reduce the costs of errors. If choosing is a benefit 
rather than a cost because people enjoy it, there is a further reason 
for active choosing. By hypothesis, the decision to choose is a 
benefit, and in such cases, people should choose to choose. But if 
the area is complex, technical, unfamiliar, and novel, there is a 
strong argument against active choosing, because that approach will 
increase decision costs and potentially error costs as well. Another 
question is whether people believe that choosing is intrinsically 
desirable or not.21 Often they do, but choosing not to choose is itself 
a form of choice, and perhaps an active (and intrinsically desirable22) 
one. 
There is undoubtedly a great deal of heterogeneity here, both 
across persons and across contexts.23 Some people in some contexts 
would be willing to pay a premium to have the power to choose 
themselves, other things being equal; other people in other contexts 
would be willing to pay a premium to have someone else choose for 
them, other things being equal.24 (Some people like choosing wine, 
 
 20. This question is discussed in more detail in Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding By Default, 162 
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2013), and in the environmental context in Cass R. Sunstein & Lucia Reisch, 
Automatically Green: Behavioral Economics and Environmental Protection, 38 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 127 (2014). 
 21. For strong evidence that people do believe choosing is intrinsically valuable, at least in 
some contexts, see Björn Bartling et al., The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights (U. of Zurich, 
Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper No. 120, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2255992. See also REBONATO, supra note 1, at 382 (“Failing to make (or 
rarely making) this important distinction between the outcome in itself and the full choice 
process (outcome plus the ability or otherwise of choosing) is at the root of the widespread 
absence in the libertarian paternalistic literature of a sympathetic treatment of autonomy.”). 
 22. Bartling et al., supra note 21, do not test this proposition, but there is every reason to 
expect that any such test would so suggest. 
 23. For a finding that people do believe that the power to decide is intrinsically valuable, 
cutting across a relatively diverse population, see Bartling et al., supra note 21. 
 24. Ernst Fehr, Holger Herz & Tom Wilkening, The Lure of Authority: Motivation and 
Incentive Effects of Power, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1325, 1328–29 (2013). Compare the related 
phenomenon of “reactance,” which suggests a negative reaction to persuasive efforts, produced 
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while other people hate it; the same is true for retirement plans and 
for cell phones. In both contexts, it matters a great deal whether 
people have an antecedent preference for particular wines or 
particular plans or particular cell phones.) People tend to have an 
intuitive appreciation of these points and to incorporate them into 
their judgments about whether and when to choose. An 
investigation of particular areas often reveals both the force and the 
weakness of the argument for active choosing. Many restaurants, for 
example, do best with a large menu, offering people diverse items, 
but tourists in unfamiliar nations may well prefer a default menu—a 
difference that reflects the costs of decisions and the costs of errors. 
An interesting question is whether, in identifiable contexts, people 
are too willing (for example, because of overconfidence), or 
insufficiently willing (for example, because of excessive trust in 
certain institutions), to choose. Further empirical research would be 
extremely valuable on that question. 
At first glance, it seems that the choice between active choosing 
and some kind of default rule, based on decision costs and error 
costs, should be made by people themselves, at least if the interests 
of third parties are not involved. If choosers choose not to choose, 
or if that is what they would choose if asked, their choice (even if 
imputed rather than explicit) should generally be respected. To that 
extent, choice-requiring paternalism should be avoided. Unless 
there is some kind of market failure, including a behavioral market 
failure (such as “present bias,” meaning an emphasis on the short-
term and a neglect of the future),25 private and public institutions 
should not insist on active choosing when people prefer not to 
choose (just as they should not insist on a default rule when people 
prefer active choosing). 
An important qualification is that the argument for active 
choosing gains strength when learning and the development of 
values and preferences are important.26 In such cases, choice-
 
in part by the desire to assert autonomy. See generally SHARON BREHM & JACK BREHM, 
PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL (1981); Louisa Pavey 
& Paul Sparks, Reactance, Autonomy and Paths to Persuasion: Examining Perceptions of 
Threats to Freedom and Informational Value, 33 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 277 (2009) 
(discussing the effects of reactance by individuals). 
 25. For discussion and references, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF 
LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 35–39 (2014). 
 26. As we shall see, however, there is a strong response to this argument: People can also 
learn from making the choice between choosing and not choosing. 
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requiring paternalism might have real appeal. This point raises a 
significant cautionary note about any program that defaults people 
into goods or services on the basis of their own previous choices—a 
seemingly attractive approach that might nonetheless prove an 
obstacle to learning and to what we might consider a form of self-
expansion, and even autonomy, by people in their roles as both 
consumers and citizens. In such cases, choice-requiring paternalism 
has strong justifications. As we shall see, some evidence, which I 
present here, suggests that people have an intuitive appreciation of 
this point as well. 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part II 
explores how, and in what settings, active choosing might be 
required. Part III draws attention to choice-requiring paternalism 
and shows that it is not a contradiction in terms. It explains that 
when people choose not to choose, required active choosing counts 
as a form of paternalism, one that runs into both welfare-based and 
autonomy-based arguments in favor of freedom of choice (including 
the choice not to choose). Part IV investigates why active choosing 
may or may not be desirable from the point of view of both choosers 
and choice architects (understood as the people who design default 
rules and other aspects of the background against which choices are 
made27). Part V offers a brief note on “big data,” predictive 
shopping, and presumed choice. It presents some empirical findings, 
including a nationally representative survey, suggesting considerable 
public ambivalence about predictive shopping, with both significant 
support and significant opposition. It also suggests that in ordinary 
market contexts, the best argument for active choosing is that 
choosers know best what they want, but that with the rise of big 
data, sellers may have equally good information, potentially 
supporting the otherwise objectionable idea of default purchases. 
II.  VARIETIES OF CHOICE 
Many of those who embrace active choosing believe that 
consumers of goods and services should be free from government 
influence.28 Of course, proponents of active choosing recognize that 
in markets, producers will impose influences of multiple kinds, but 
 
 27. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 81–100 (discussing choice architecture in 
detail). 
 28. This is the general thrust of REBONATO, supra note 1, which stands as the most forceful 
critique of libertarian paternalism.  
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they nonetheless contend that when third parties are not affected, 
and when force and fraud are not involved, government should 
remain neutral. They reject paternalism on government’s part.29 
Perhaps it is legitimate for public officials to require the provision of 
accurate information so as to ensure that consumers’ choices are 
adequately informed. But if government seeks to “nudge”30 people 
in its preferred directions in other ways—by imposing default rules 
or embracing paternalism of any kind—it is exceeding its 
appropriate bounds. 
But what does active choosing entail?31 What does it mean to 
“require” people to indicate their preferences? 
A. Three Faces of Active Choosing 
Those who insist on the inevitability of default rules will object 
that there is no good answer to the latter question. Even if choice 
architects seek to promote active choosing, they have to specify 
what happens if people simply refuse to choose. Isn’t the answer 
some kind of default rule? 
The question is the right one, because some kind of default rule 
is ultimately necessary. Choice architects have to establish what 
happens if people decline to choose. But we can nonetheless identify 
three different ways that active choosing might be required. For 
shorthand, we can refer to them as direct penalties, leveraging, and 
ordinary market arrangements; each raises its own complexities. 
Only government can impose direct penalties, but leveraging and 
ordinary market arrangements are available to both private and 
public institutions. 
1. Direct Penalties.  In most contexts, no one contends that if 
people fail to make a choice, they should be imprisoned or otherwise 
punished. The sanction for that failure is that they do not receive a 
 
 29. Id.; Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1063–67.  
 30. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 13–14. 
 31. I understand the term in a purely formal sense, to capture a response to a question 
about what one prefers. One might answer that question without having any kind of substantive 
preference. It would be possible to understand “choosing” in a functional rather than formal 
sense, to capture deciding for reasons, as distinguished from simply “picking,” which is akin to 
tossing a coin. For that important discussion, see Edna Ullmann-Margalit & Sidney 
Morgenbesser, Picking and Choosing, 44 SOC. RES. 757, 757–60 (1977). As I understand it here, 
active choosing includes “picking,” and can occur even when people lack an antecedent 
preference.  
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good or service (see Parts II.A.2 and II.A.3 below). But there are 
exceptions. In some nations, including Australia, Belgium, and 
(before 1970) the Netherlands, people have been subject to civil 
sanctions if they fail to vote,32 and in that sense punished for refusing 
to make an active choice. So too, the Affordable Care Act requires 
people to make a choice about health insurance, subject to economic 
penalties if they fail to do so.33 
With respect to active choosing, both of these examples do have 
a wrinkle: people are being forced to choose along one dimension 
(for whom to vote and which health-insurance plan to obtain), but 
are being prohibited from choosing along another dimension 
(whether to vote or to obtain health insurance). But insofar as one 
kind of choice is being required, we may fairly speak of required 
active choosing. We could imagine other contexts in which people 
would face sanctions if they did not choose, though admittedly such 
cases look more like science fiction than the real world. Consider 
cases in which people must decide whether to become organ donors 
(or face criminal penalties) or must choose privacy settings on their 
computer (subject to civil sanctions if they do not). The fact that 
sanctions are rarely imposed on those who choose not to choose 
might be taken to suggest an implicit recognition that in a free 
society, such choices are generally acceptable and indeed a 
legitimate part of consumer sovereignty. One reason involves 
information: people know best what they want, and others should 
not choose for them, even if the choice is not to choose.34 
2. Leveraging.  In some cases, choice architects require active 
choosing with respect to a related or ancillary matter as a condition of 
obtaining a good or service (or a job). It is in this sense that a form of 
leveraging is involved. Active choosing is mandatory, but in a 
distinctive sense: unless people make an active choice on some 
matter, they cannot obtain a good or service, even though that good 
or service, narrowly defined, is not the specific topic of the choice that 
 
 32. Lisa Hill, Low Voter Turnout in the United States: Is Compulsory Voting a Viable 
Solution?, 18 J. THEORETICAL POL. 207, 208 (2006). 
 33. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). Note that by 2015, large employers will be required to adopt 
a form of automatic enrollment for health insurance. 29 U.S.C. § 218A (2012). 
 34. For a powerful demonstration, see Joel Waldfogel, SCROOGENOMICS: WHY YOU 
SHOULDN’T BUY PRESENTS FOR THE HOLIDAYS, 1–5 (2009) (showing that even family 
members and close friends make large mistakes in choosing presents during the holiday season). 
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they are being asked to make.35 We can imagine a continuum of 
connections between the matter in question (for which an active 
choice is being required) and the specific good that has already been 
chosen. There would be a close connection if, for example, people 
were told that unless they indicated their preferences with respect to 
car insurance, they could not rent a car. So too, there would be a close 
connection if people were told that unless they created a password, or 
indicated their preferences with respect to privacy settings, they could 
not use their computer. And indeed, both of these kinds of cases are 
standard. In markets, sellers sometimes insist that purchasers make 
an active choice on some related matter in order to obtain or use a 
product. 
By contrast, there would be a weaker connection if people were 
informed that they could not work with a particular employer until 
they indicated their preferences with respect to their retirement 
plan. The connection would be weaker still if people were told that 
they could not obtain a driver’s license unless they indicated their 
preferences with respect to organ donation. The connection would 
be even weaker if people were told that they could not register to 
vote unless they specified their preferred privacy settings on their 
computer. 
In the final two examples—and especially the last—there is not 
a close connection between the matter on which people are being 
asked to make a choice and the good that they are specifically 
seeking.36 In cases of this kind, the choice architect is requiring an 
active choice on a matter that is genuinely ancillary. Note that in 
some cases that fall into this category, the requirement of active 
choosing has a strongly coercive dimension insofar as the good in 
question is one that people cannot easily reject (such as a driver’s 
license, a job, or a right to vote). It is in this sense that the choice 
architect is, in effect, leveraging that good to ensure an active choice 
on some other matter. 
In terms of evaluation, we might want to distinguish between 
public and private institutions here. Perhaps private institutions, 
 
 35. The case of prompted choice is different, because there is no requirement. See supra 
note 17 and accompanying text. 
 36. There is a counterargument in the case of organ donation. In 2007, for example, motor-
vehicle accidents accounted for about 20 percent of all organ donations. Stacy Dickert-Conlin, 
Todd Elder & Brian Moore, Donorcycles: Motorcycle Helmet Laws and the Supply of Organ 
Donors, 54 J.L. & ECON. 907, 912 tbl.1 (2011). 
 
SUNSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2014  1:40 PM 
2014] CHOOSING NOT TO CHOOSE 15 
disciplined as they are by market forces, should freely compete 
along this dimension as along others. Perhaps public institutions 
should think long and hard before requiring people to choose, 
unless there is a close connection between the good or service in 
question and the object of active choice. But we should not be 
dogmatic here. If a public institution is requiring people to choose in 
order to save lives, and if its strategy is effective, we should hesitate 
before concluding that it has acted illegitimately. 
3. Ordinary Market Arrangements.  In most markets, active 
choosing among goods, services, or jobs is a condition for obtaining a 
good, a service, or a job. For consumption decisions in ordinary 
markets, people are usually given a range of options, and they can 
choose one or more of them, or none at all. Unless they make a 
choice, they will not obtain the relevant good or service. They are not 
defaulted into purchasing tablets, cell phones, shoes, or fishing poles. 
Indeed, this is the standard pattern. When people visit a website, a 
restaurant, or a grocery or appliance store, they are generally asked 
to make an active choice. The default—understood as what happens 
if they do nothing—is that no product will be purchased. People do 
not receive goods or services unless they have actively chosen them. 
The same point holds for the employment market. People are 
typically not defaulted into particular jobs, at least not in any formal 
sense. They have a range of options, and unless they take one, they 
will be unemployed. In this respect, free markets generally require 
active choosing. 
There is nothing inevitable about this situation. We could 
imagine a situation in which sellers assume, or presume, that people 
want certain products, and in which buyers obtain them, and have to 
pay for them, passively. Imagine, for example, that a bookseller has 
sufficient information to know, for a fact, that Johnson would want 
to buy any new book by Stephen King, Amartya Sen, Sendhil 
Mullainathan, or Joyce Carol Oates, or that Smith would like to 
purchase a new version of a particular tablet, or that Winston would 
want to buy a certain pair of sneakers, or that when McMurtry runs 
out of toothpaste, he would like new toothpaste of exactly the same 
kind. If the sellers’ judgments are unerring, or even nearly so, would 
it be troublesome and intrusive, or instead a great benefit, for them 
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to arrange the relevant purchases by default? Existing technology is 
increasingly raising this question.37 
There is a good argument that the strongest reason to require 
active choosing is that reliable predictive shopping algorithms do 
not exist, and hence active choosing is an indispensable safeguard 
against erroneous purchases. If they are not entirely accurate, 
predictive algorithms might not serve the interests of those who 
might be denominated purchasers (by default). On this view, the 
argument for active choosing is rooted in the view that affirmative 
consent protects against mistakes—which leaves open the possibility 
of “predictive shopping” if and when a reliable technology becomes 
available. To the extent that such technology does not exist, 
predictive shopping would be unacceptable. I will return to these 
issues in Part V. 
To these general claims, the major qualification is that some 
institution—usually the law—has already given people rights of a 
certain kind, and what that institution has already supplied 
determines what people will later need to buy in markets. Markets 
require a background set of entitlements, establishing what people 
have and do not have, before they begin to choose. Individual 
choosers did not select those entitlements, which are given rather 
than chosen (and the selection might reflect a form of paternalism). 
For example, people might have some kind of “default 
entitlement” to sue for age discrimination, a right that they can 
waive for a price;38 some entitlements of this kind (such as the right 
to sue for discrimination on the basis of race and sex) are not 
waivable, in the sense that no waiver would be legally valid.39 
Because people’s preferences may be affected by decisions about 
background entitlements,40 a form of paternalism may be difficult or 
 
 37. See Greg Bensinger, Amazon Wants to Ship Your Package Before You Buy It, WALL 
ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2014, 3:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/01/17/amazon-wants-to-ship-
your-package-before-you-buy-it/?mod=e2tw. 
 38. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2012) (“An individual may not waive any right or claim 
under this chapter unless . . . the individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for 
consideration in addition to anything of value to which the individual already is entitled . . . .”). 
 39. See, e.g., Brooklyn Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945) (holding that employees 
may not waive their rights to the minimum wage or overtime pay under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012)). 
 40. See generally Keith M. Marzilli Ericson & Andreas Fuster, The Endowment Effect 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 19384, 2013), available at 
www.nber.org/papers/w19384 (describing how people ascribe more value to things merely 
because they own them). 
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perhaps impossible to avoid insofar as some person or institution is 
making those decisions.41 If people’s preferences are an artifact of 
entitlements, we cannot select entitlements by asking about those 
preferences. But with background entitlements in place, people 
usually do not obtain goods or services unless they have actively 
chosen them (putting gifts to one side). 
B. Institutions as Choice Architects 
As the examples suggest, both private and public institutions 
might choose leveraging or ordinary market arrangements, though 
of course only government can impose direct penalties. It should be 
clear that active choosing is far from inevitable. Instead of imposing 
active choosing, an institution might select some kind of default 
rule, specifying what happens if people do nothing.42 
For example, those who obtain driver’s licenses might be 
defaulted into being organ donors, or those who start work with a 
particular employer might be defaulted into a specific retirement or 
health-care plan. Alternatively, those who make an active choice to 
purchase a particular product—say, a book or a subscription to a 
magazine—might be enrolled into a program by which they continue 
to receive a similar product periodically, whether or not they have 
made an active choice to do that. The Book-of-the-Month Club 
famously employed a strategy of this sort.43 
An active choice to purchase a product might also produce a 
default rule that is unrelated to the product—as, for example, where 
purchase of a particular book automatically enrolled someone in a 
health-care plan, or where an active choice to enroll in a health-care 
plan produced default enrollment in a book club. In extreme cases, 
where disclosure is insufficiently clear, an approach of this kind 
might be a form of fraud, though we could also imagine cases in 
which such an approach would actually track people’s preferences. 
Suppose, for example, that a private institution knows that people 
 
 41. I am bracketing the possibility that entitlements are a product of a “spontaneous order” 
of some sort, rather than of any kind of decision. For a valuable discussion, see generally Edna 
Ullmann-Margalit, Invisible Hand Explanations, 39 SYNTHESE 263 (1978). 
 42. Recall that leveraging and ordinary market arrangements also come with a kind of 
default rule: unless people make an active choice, they will have no good, no service, and no 
employment. 
 43. See Peter Bowal, Reluctance to Regulate: The Case of Negative Option Marketing, 36 
AM. BUS. L.J. 377, 378–79 (1999) (describing the Club’s requirement that members decide to 
opt out before actually receiving the book if they did not wish to be billed). 
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who purchase product X (say, certain kinds of music) also tend to 
like product Y (say, certain kinds of books). Suggestions of various 
kinds, default advertisements, default presentations of political 
views, and perhaps even default purchases could be welcome and 
beneficial, unfamiliar though the link might seem. For example, the 
website Pandora tracks users’ music preferences, from which it can 
make some inferences about likely tastes and judgments about other 
matters, including politics.44 
We could also imagine cases in which people are explicitly 
asked to choose whether they want to choose.45 Consumers might be 
asked: Do you want to choose your cell-phone settings, or do you 
want to be defaulted into settings that seem to work best for most 
people, or for people like you? Do you want to choose your own 
health-insurance plan, or do you want to be defaulted into the plan 
that seems best for people in your demographic category? In such 
cases, many people may well decide in favor of a default rule, and 
thus decline to choose, because of a second-order desire not to do 
so. They might not trust their own judgment; they might not want to 
learn. The topic might make them anxious. They might have better 
things to do. 
This approach—simplified active choosing, in the form of active 
choosing with the option of using a default—has considerable 
promise and appeal, not least because it avoids many of the 
influences contained in a default rule,46 and might therefore seem 
highly respectful of autonomy while also allowing people to select 
the default. For cell-phone settings or health-insurance plans, active 
choosers can actively select a particular option if they like, while 
others can (actively) choose the default. Note, however, that 
 
 44. For evidence to this effect, see Natasha Singer, Listen to Pandora, and It Listens Back, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2014, at BU3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/technology/
pandora-mines-users-data-to-better-target-ads.html. Consider in particular: “During the next 
federal election cycle, for instance, Pandora users tuning into country music acts, stand-up 
comedians or Christian bands might hear or see ads for Republican candidates for Congress. 
Others listening to hip-hop tunes, or to classical acts like the Berlin Philharmonic, might hear 
ads for Democrats.” Id. 
 45. Bartling & Fischbacher, supra note 12, at 69, shows that people will often say “yes,” 
other things being equal, thus supporting the conclusion that decision rights have intrinsic value. 
We can agree with that conclusion while also asserting that in some cases, the intrinsic value will 
be outweighed by the instrumental value of delegation (as, for example, where people believe 
they will err, or where people are busy). 
 46. See Rebonato, supra note 1, at 371–72 (emphasizing the risks of default rules, which 
tend to stick). 
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simplified active choosing is not quite a perfect solution, at least for 
those people who genuinely do not want to choose. After all, they 
are being asked to do exactly that. At least some of those people 
likely do not want to have to choose between active choosing and a 
default rule, and hence they would prefer a default rule to an active 
choice between active choosing and a default rule. Even that active 
choice can be costly and time-consuming, and some or many people 
might not want to bother. In this respect, supposedly libertarian 
paternalism, in the form of an active choice between active choosing 
and a default, itself has a strong nonlibertarian dimension—a 
conclusion that brings us directly to the next section. 
III.  CHOICE-REQUIRING PATERNALISM 
A. Does the Nanny State Forbid Choosing Not to Choose? 
Is it paternalistic to require active choosing, when people would 
prefer not to choose? To answer that question, we have to start by 
defining paternalism. There is of course an immensely large 
literature on that question.47 Let us bracket the hardest questions 
and note that while diverse definitions have been given, it seems 
clear that the unifying theme of paternalistic approaches is that 
private or public institutions do not believe that people’s choices will 
promote their own welfare, and they are taking steps to influence or 
alter people’s choices for their own good.48 
What is wrong with paternalism, thus defined? Those who reject 
paternalism typically invoke welfare, autonomy, or both.49 They tend 
to believe that individuals are the best judges of their own interests, 
and of what would promote their welfare, and that outsiders should 
decline to intervene because they lack crucial information.50 John 
Stuart Mill himself contended that this is the essential problem with 
outsiders, including government officials. Emphasizing the 
 
 47. See generally, e.g., PATERNALISM (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2013) 
(compiling various essays on the state of the debate surrounding paternalism); GERALD 
DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988) (offering a theory of autonomy 
and exploring how autonomy helps us make sense of cultural intuitions). 
 48. For a valuable and relevant discussion, bearing particularly on means paternalism, see 
B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice Theoretic 
Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics, 124 Q.J. ECON. 51, 86 (2009). 
 49. For an especially helpful discussion, see generally Rebonato, supra note 1. 
 50. Friedrich Hayek, The Market and Other Orders, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF F. A. 
HAYEK 384–86 (Bruce Caldwell ed., 2013). 
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importance of avoiding paternalism on explicitly welfarist grounds, 
Mill insisted that the individual “is the person most interested in his 
own well-being,”51 and that the “ordinary man or woman has means 
of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed 
by anyone else.”52 When society seeks to overrule the individual’s 
judgment, it does so on the basis of “general presumptions,” and 
these “may be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not 
to be misapplied to individual cases.”53 Mill’s goal was to ensure that 
people’s lives go well, and he contended that the best solution is for 
public officials to allow people to find their own path.54 Consider in 
this regard Hayek’s remarkable suggestion that “the awareness of our 
irremediable ignorance of most of what is known to somebody [who 
is a planner] is the chief basis of the argument for liberty.”55 
It is clear that this is an argument about welfare, grounded in a 
claim about the superior information held by individuals. But there is 
an independent argument from autonomy,56 which emphasizes that 
even if people do not know what is best for them, and even if they 
would choose poorly, they are entitled to do as they see fit (at least as 
long as harm to others, or some kind of collective-action problem, is 
not involved). On this view, freedom of choice has intrinsic and not 
merely instrumental value. It is an insult to individual dignity, and a 
form of infantilization, to eliminate people’s ability to go their own 
way.57 
Whether or not these objections to paternalism are convincing,58 
there are legitimate questions about whether and how they apply to 
people whose choice is not to choose. On reflection, they apply quite 
well, and so choice-requiring paternalism is no oxymoron. People 
might decline to choose for multiple reasons. They might believe that 
they lack information or expertise. They might fear that they will err. 
 
 51. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 136–37 (2d ed., 1869) (1859). 
 52. Id. at 137. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See also Hayek, supra note 5, at 519 (noting that no one mind is ever given all of the 
economic data of a society).  
 55. Hayek, supra note 50, at 384. 
 56. For a recent version, suggesting people should be free to make their own mistakes, see 
generally Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 1. 
 57. For empirical evidence that people sometimes accept this view, see Bartling, et al., 
supra note 21. For an illuminating and skeptical discussion, suggesting that overriding choices 
need not entail a lack of respect, see CONLY, supra note 1. 
 58. For detailed discussion exploring these paternalism objections, see CONLY, supra note 
1, at 1–7, and see generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 25. 
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They might not enjoy the act of choosing; they might like it better if 
someone else decides for them. They might not want to incur the 
emotional costs of choosing, especially for situations that are painful 
or difficult to contemplate (such as organ donation or end-of-life 
care). They might find it a relief,59 or even fun, to delegate. They 
might not want to take responsibility.60 They might be too busy.61 
They might not want to pay the psychological costs associated with 
regretting their choice.62 Active choosing saddles choosers with 
responsibility for their choices, and it may reduce their welfare for 
that reason. 
In daily life, people defer to others, including friends and family 
members, on countless matters, and they are often better off as a 
result. In ordinary relationships, people benefit from the functional 
equivalent of default rules, some explicitly articulated, others not. 
Within a marriage, for example, certain decisions (such as managing 
finances or planning dinners or vacations) might be made by the 
husband or wife by default, subject to the right to opt out in particular 
circumstances. That practice has close analogues in many contexts in 
which people are dealing with private or public institutions and 
choose not to choose. Indeed, people are often willing to pay others a 
great deal to make their choices for them. But even when there is no 
explicit payment or grant of the power of agency, people might well 
prefer a situation in which they are relieved of the obligation to 
choose, because such relief will reduce decision costs, error costs, or 
both. 
Suppose, for example, that Jones believes that he is not likely to 
make a good choice about his retirement plan, and that he would 
therefore prefer a default rule, chosen by someone who is a specialist 
 
 59. For related discussion of the many things people may prefer not to know, see Edna 
Ullmann-Margalit, On Not Wanting to Know, in REASONING PRACTICALLY 1 (Edna Ullmann-
Margalit ed., 2000). 
 60. For an emphasis on delegation to a randomized process, see Dwengler et al., supra note 
12, at 34–35. On the role of guilt, see Aristeidis Theotokis & Emmanouela Manganari, The 
Impact of Choice Architecture on Sustainable Consumer Behavior: The Role of Guilt, J. BUS. 
ETHICS (July 19, 2014), available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10551-014-2287-
4 (finding that opt-out default policies are more effective than opt-in policies in the 
environmental area, because they increase anticipated guilt).  
 61. See MULLAINATHAN & SHAFIR, supra note 11, at 162 (suggesting a “bandwidth tax” 
can make people too busy for certain choices). 
 62. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 2. But see Jeffrey R. Brown, Anne M. Farrell & Scott J. 
Weisbenner, The Downside of Defaults (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 12-05, 
2012), available at http://www.nber.org/aging/rrc/papers/orrc12-05.pdf (finding higher levels of 
regret in cases in which people chose a default rather than making an active choice). 
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in the subject at hand. In Mill’s terms, doesn’t Jones know best? Or 
suppose that Smith is exceedingly busy, and wants to focus on her 
most important concerns, not on which health-insurance plan is right 
for her or which privacy setting she should use on her computer. 
Doesn’t Mill’s argument support respect for Smith’s choice? In such 
cases, the welfarist arguments seem to favor deference to the 
chooser’s choice, even if that choice is not to choose. If we believe in 
freedom of choice on the ground that people are uniquely situated to 
know what is best for them,63 then that very argument should support 
respect for people when they freely choose not to choose. 
Or suppose that Harper, exercising his or her autonomy, decides 
to delegate decisionmaking authority to someone else, and thus to 
relinquish the power to choose, in a context that involves health 
insurance, energy providers, privacy, or credit-card plans. Is it an 
insult to Harper’s dignity, or instead a way of honoring it, if a private 
or public institution refuses to respect that choice? It is at least 
plausible to suppose that respect for autonomy requires respect for 
people’s decisions about whether and when to choose. That view 
seems especially reasonable in view of the fact that people are in a 
position to make countless decisions, and they might well decide that 
they would like to exercise their autonomy by focusing on their 
foremost concerns, not on what seems trivial, boring, or difficult.64 
With respect to medical care, note in this connection that “a 
substantial number of” studies find that patients “do not want to 
make their own medical decisions, or perhaps even to participate in 
those decisions in any very significant way.”65 
These points raise a broader question: In general, are people 
genuinely bothered by the existence of default rules, or would they be 
bothered if they were made aware that such rules had been chosen for 
them? We do not have a full answer to this question; the setting, and 
the level of trust, undoubtedly matter. But note in this regard the 
empirical finding, in the context of end-of-life care, that when people 
are explicitly informed that a default rule is in place, and that it has 
been chosen because it affects their decisions, there is essentially no 
 
 63. See Hayek, supra note 5, at 528–30 (arguing people are capable of using available facts 
to make good choices). 
 64. See Esther Duflo, Tanner Lectures on Human Values and the Design of the Fight 
Against Poverty 14 (May 2, 2012), http://economics.mit.edu/files/7904 (discussing how people 
who are poor face more basic life choices). 
 65. SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 41. 
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effect on what people do. This finding suggests that people are not 
uncomfortable with defaults as such.66 
To be sure, we could imagine hard cases in which a choice not to 
choose seems to be an alienation of freedom. In the extreme case, 
people might choose to be slaves or otherwise to relinquish their 
liberty, in the sense of their choice-making power, in some 
fundamental way.67 In a less extreme case, people might choose not to 
vote, not in the sense of failing to show up at the polls, but in the 
sense of (formally) delegating their vote to others. Such delegations 
are impermissible,68 perhaps because they would undo the internal 
logic of a system of voting (in part by creating a collective-action 
problem that a prohibition on vote-selling solves69), but perhaps also 
because individuals would be relinquishing their own freedom to 
govern themselves. Or perhaps people might choose not to make 
choices with respect to their religious convictions, or their future 
spouse,70 and might instead delegate those choices to others. In cases 
that involve central features of people’s lives, we might conclude that 
freedom of choice cannot be alienated and that the relevant decisions 
must be made by the individuals themselves. It is a complex question 
which cases fall into this category.71 But even if the category is fairly 
large, it cannot easily be taken as a general objection to the 
proposition that on autonomy grounds, people should be allowed not 
to choose in multiple domains. 
It is important to acknowledge that the choice not to choose may 
not be in the chooser’s interest (as the chooser would define it). For 
that reason, choice-requiring paternalism might have a welfarist 
 
 66. See George Loewenstein, Cindy Bryce, David Hagmann & Sachin Rajpal, Warning: 
You Are About To Be Nudged 17 (Mar. 29, 2014) (unpublished working paper) 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=2417383) (“[I]nforming people about default interventions in 
advance . . . does not significantly diminish the impact of defaults on expressed preferences in 
advance directives.”). 
 67. For an overview, see generally Andrew Sneddon, What’s Wrong with Selling Yourself 
Into Slavery? Paternalism and Deep Autonomy, 33 CRÍTICA, REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE 
FILOSOFIA 97 (2001). 
 68. Steven Rieber, Vote-Selling and Self-Interested Voting, 15 PUB. AFF. Q. 35, 36–38 
(2001).  
 69. The basic idea is that if vote-selling were permitted, voting power could be 
concentrated in individuals or individual entities, and while decisions to sell might be 
individually rational, the result would be bad if a considerable number of people sold their 
votes. See id. 
 70. For discussion of arranged marriages, see Amitrajeet Batabyal, On the Likelihood of 
Finding the Right Partner in an Arranged Marriage, 33 J. SOCIO-ECON. 273, 274 (2001). 
 71. CONLY, supra note 1, at 7. 
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justification. Perhaps the chooser chooses not to choose only because 
he lacks important information (which would reveal that the default 
rule is harmful), underestimates the value of learning, or suffers from 
some form of bounded rationality. A behavioral market failure 
(understood as a nonstandard market failure that comes from human 
error72) might infect a choice not to choose, just as it might infect a 
choice about what to choose. 
A non-chooser might, for example, be unduly affected by 
“availability bias,” because of an overreaction to a recent situation in 
which his own choice went wrong.73 Or perhaps the chooser is myopic 
and is excessively influenced by the short-term costs of choosing, 
which might require some learning (and hence some investment), 
while underestimating the long-term benefits, which might be very 
large. A form of “present bias”74 might infect the decision not to 
choose. People might face a kind of intrapersonal collective-action 
problem, in which such a decision by Jones, at Time 1, turns out to be 
welfare-reducing for Jones at Times 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
But for those who reject paternalism, these kinds of concerns are 
usually a justification for providing more and better information—not 
for blocking people’s choices, including their choices not to choose. In 
these respects, the welfarist objections to paternalism seem to apply 
as well to those who insist on active choosing. Of course welfarists 
might be wrong to object to paternalism.75 But with respect to their 
objections, the question is whether the choice not to choose is, in 
general or in particular contexts, likely to go wrong, and in the 
abstract, there is no reason to think that this particular choice would 
be especially error-prone. In light of people’s tendency to 
overconfidence, the choice not to choose might even be peculiarly 
likely to be right, which would create serious problems for choice-
requiring paternalism.76 
Consider in this regard evidence that people spend too much 
time trying to make precisely the right choice, in a way that leads to 
 
 72. See generally OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012); SUNSTEIN, supra note 25. 
 73. A good overview is Rolf Reber, Availability, in COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK 
ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGMENT AND MEMORY 147 (Rüdiger F. Pohl ed., 
2012).  
 74. For a summary, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 35.  
 75. See CONLY, supra note 1, 7–8. 
 76. See Ulrich Hoffrage, Overconfidence, in COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON 
FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGMENT AND MEMORY, supra note 73, at 235.  
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significant welfare losses. In many situations, people underestimate 
the temporal costs of choosing and exaggerate the benefits, producing 
“systematic mistakes in predicting the effect of having more, vs. less, 
choice freedom on task performance and task-induced affect.”77 If 
people make such systematic mistakes, it stands to reason that they 
might well choose to choose in circumstances in which they ought not 
do so on welfarist grounds. 
My aim is not to say that welfarists are right to reject 
paternalism;78 it is only to say that the underlying arguments apply to 
all forms of paternalism, including those that would interfere with the 
decision not to choose. To be sure, some welfarists are willing to 
interfere with people’s choices; they may well be libertarian or 
nonlibertarian paternalists.79 The central points are that the standard 
welfarist arguments on behalf of freedom of choice apply to those 
who (freely) choose not to choose, and that those who want to 
interfere with such choices might well be paternalists. And from the 
standpoint of autonomy, interference with the choice not to choose 
can be paternalistic as well, and therefore objectionable to those who 
reject paternalism, unless it is fairly urged that that choice counts as 
some kind of alienation of freedom (as in the case of slavery and 
arguable analogues, discussed above80). 
B. Cases 
In which cases would it be paternalistic to reject a choice not to 
choose? Begin with direct penalties, described above.81 Suppose that 
citizens are subjected to criminal punishment if they do not choose 
(for example, to vote or to purchase health care) and that they wish 
not to choose. To know whether paternalism is involved, we need to 
identify the reason that people are being forced to choose. If people 
face some kind of collective-action problem, and if coercion is 
 
 77. See Botti & Hsee, supra note 16, at 161. 
 78. For discussion, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 87–122. 
 79. See generally CONLY, supra note 1. 
 80. An exploration of these cases would require an assessment of some foundational issues. 
Note, however, that when choosing not to choose seems to be an alienation of liberty, it is 
because in the context at hand, people are required to take responsibility for their own 
decisions, and because a delegation to others, or a relinquishment of authority, seems to be an 
abdication of that responsibility. It is for this reason that slavery is a defining case, and that a 
delegation of the power to vote, or to choose one’s spouse, would raise serious problems. These 
are of course very brief and inadequate remarks on a complex subject.  
 81. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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meant to solve that problem, paternalism is not involved. But if 
public officials believe that people would be better off choosing, and 
if they are punishing people in order to ensure that they do what is 
best for themselves, then we have a case of paternalism. Everything 
turns on the reason for the punishment. 
Whether or not people should be forced to vote or to purchase 
health care, there is a plausible argument that in both contexts, the 
goal of coercion is to solve a collective-action problem. But we could 
easily imagine cases in which people are being forced to choose on 
the ground that it is good for them to do so, even if they think 
otherwise. Some people who support both compulsory voting and 
the “individual mandate” for health insurance believe exactly that. 
In the latter context, the idea might be that citizens suffer from 
inertia82 or fail to make a choice that will protect them in the event 
that things go unexpectedly wrong. 
Now turn to leveraging,83 which seems to involve many of the 
most interesting cases. In those cases, some choosers undoubtedly 
have a second-order preference not to choose, and active choosing 
interferes with or overrides that preference. Nonetheless, choice 
architects impose a requirement of active choosing in circumstances 
in which some or many people, faced with the option, would choose 
not to choose.84 Is requiring active choosing paternalistic for that 
reason? 
As before, the answer turns on why choice architects insist on 
active choice. In the case of organ donation, paternalism is not 
involved. The goal is to protect third parties, not choosers.85 So too 
when choice architects favor default rules that reduce environmental 
harms; in such cases, third parties are at risk.86 But suppose that as a 
condition of entering into an employment relationship, employees 
are asked or required to make an active choice with respect to their 
retirement plan; suppose too that choice architects believe that it is 
good for them to do so, even though prospective employees disagree 
 
 82. See Punam Anand Keller, Bari Harlam, George Loewenstein & Kevin G. Volpp, 
Enhanced Active Choice: A New Method to Motivate Behavior Change, 21 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 
376, 377–78 (2011). 
 83. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 84. Recall that with prompted choice, which does not require people to do anything, the 
paternalistic element is reduced (though not eliminated). See supra note 17 and accompanying 
text. 
 85. I turn to the resulting issues in Part IV.C. 
 86. See Sunstein & Reisch, supra note 20, at 5. 
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(and would prefer to be defaulted). If so, then choice architects are 
acting paternalistically. In such cases, those who insist on active 
choosing are hardly avoiding paternalism; they are engaging in it. 
It might seem puzzling to suggest that paternalism could be 
involved in ordinary market arrangements, the third variety of 
active choosing.87 How can it be paternalistic to say that you do not 
own a pair of shoes, a tablet, an automobile, or a fish sandwich 
unless you have actively chosen it? The question is a good one, but 
it should not be taken as rhetorical; everything depends on the 
reasons that underlie the creation of a particular system of choice 
architecture.88 To be sure, there are many justifications for free 
markets and active choosing, and a number of them have nothing to 
do with paternalism. Some of those justifications speak of efficiency 
and others of liberty or autonomy.89 But suppose that we think that 
active choosing is a way to ensure that people develop certain 
characteristics and tastes. Suppose that the idea is that whatever 
choosers actually want, they stand to gain independence, self-
sufficiency, and a sense of initiative, and that a system of active 
choosing (subject to background entitlements) is desirable for 
exactly that reason. That would be a paternalistic justification. 
This view is hardly foreign to those who emphasize the 
importance of freedom of choice; it plays a significant role in Mill’s 
own defense of liberty.90 It is also a cousin of an early defense of free 
markets, memorably sketched by the economist Albert Hirschmann, 
which emphasizes that free commerce creates a certain kind of 
culture in which traditional social antagonisms, based on religion 
and ethnicity, are softened as people pursue their economic 
interests.91 For at least some of those who prize active choosing, the 
concern is not softening of social divisions, but the development of 
an engaged, spirited, and informed society. Those who favor active 
choosing often embrace a form of liberal perfectionism, embodied in 
 
 87. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 88. Again, I am bracketing here the question whether markets can be seen as a kind of 
spontaneous order, or whether they should be seen as a product of conscious design. For a 
valuable discussion, see generally Edna Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 40. 
 89. For a classic discussion, emphasizing both welfare and autonomy (understood as 
liberty), see generally FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1945). For a discussion in 
a similar vein, with an emphasis on a certain understanding of the Constitution, see RICHARD 
A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION (2014). 
 90. See, e.g., MILL, supra note 51, at 149–51. 
 91. See generally ALBERT HIRSCHMANN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS (1997). 
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the idea that the government legitimately promotes certain desirable 
characteristics, on the ground that it is best for people to have those 
characteristics.92 To the extent that active choosing promotes 
independence, self-sufficiency, and a sense of initiative, it might be 
preferred on perfectionist grounds, even if people would choose not 
to choose. 
To be sure, it is not exactly standard to see free-market 
advocates as favoring any kind of paternalism, and it is often wrong 
to see them in that way, because other justifications are available, 
and because people often do in fact have a first-order desire to 
choose, certainly in cases that involve ordinary market 
arrangements.93 But suppose that private or public institutions favor 
active choosing, and reject mandates or default rules, because they 
want to influence people for their own good. Recall that according 
to our working definition, paternalism is involved when a private or 
public institution does not believe that people’s choices will promote 
their own welfare, and when it takes steps to influence or alter 
people’s choices for their own good. If people have a second-order 
desire not to choose, and if active choosing overrides that choice, then 
paternalism is indeed involved, even in cases that fall into the 
ordinary market arrangements category.  
IV.  ACTIVE CHOOSING AS CHOICE ARCHITECTURE 
A. In Defense of Active Choosing 
What might be said on behalf of active choosing and hence 
against choosing not to choose?94 The answer is fairly clear if the 
antonym of active choosing is a mandate or a ban.95 But suppose that 
 
 92. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 426 (1986) (“It is itself part of a 
perfectionist doctrine which holds the state to be duty-bound to promote the good life.”). 
Liberal perfectionism is criticized in JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
 93. See Ernst Fehr et al., supra note 24, at 1332. 
 94. Part IV and Part V borrow from Sunstein, supra note 20, and Sunstein & Reisch, supra 
note 20. For valuable discussion, overlapping with that here, see generally Gabriel Carroll, 
James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian & Andrew Metrick, Optimal Defaults and 
Active Decisions, 124 Q.J. ECON. 1639 (2009); Bruce I. Carlin, Simon Gervais & Gustavo 
Manso, Libertarian Paternalism, Information Sharing, and Financial Decision-Making (Mar. 7, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1570158). 
 95. The point is not that a mandate or ban is always bad, but that it might reduce welfare or 
compromise autonomy, and it needs some kind of justification, standardly in the form of a 
market failure. 
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the alternative is a default rule, which maintains freedom of choice. 
Why is active choosing better than that? 
Consider an analogy. In constitutional law, the Supreme Court 
has often spoken of the nondelegation doctrine, which forbids 
Congress from delegating its legislative authority.96 The central idea is 
that Congress must choose, at least insofar as it must state some kind 
of “intelligible principle.”97 Congress is forbidden from choosing to 
allow others to choose that principle. In this respect, the 
nondelegation doctrine requires a form of active choosing on the part 
of the national legislature. It is the institutional analogue to the idea 
that individuals should not choose not to choose. 
The problem, of course, is that the courts have shown little 
enthusiasm for enforcing the doctrine, in part because it may be a 
good idea for Congress not to choose, for the same reasons that lead 
individuals to choose not to choose.98 Congress may lack expertise. It 
might be busy and lack “bandwidth.” On some questions, it might 
trust agencies more than it trusts itself, perhaps because they are able 
to master technical details. Whether or not an intelligible principle 
should be formally required,99 a legislative choice not to choose—in 
the sense of a choice to grant considerable discretion to others—often 
makes a great deal of sense.100 For courts to overrule that choice 
would not count as paternalistic, because that concept is not easily 
applied to a national legislature; but it would be an unmistakable 
intrusion into judgments that the national legislature is often in the 
best position to make. 
In this Part, I aim to uncover the factors that both choice 
architects and choosers might consider when they are deciding 
whether to favor active choosing or instead some kind of default 
rule.101 At least as a presumption, the preferences of choosers, on that 
very question, should be respected. We have seen that if private or 
public institutions do not respect those preferences, it must be 
 
 96. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935). For discussion, 
see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000). 
 97. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). 
 98. See Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1721, 1744–45 (2002). 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. at 1744. 
 101. Precommitment strategies, by which people bind themselves, raise distinctive issues, 
and I do not discuss them here. See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES 
IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1981). 
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because of some kind of error on the part of choosers, perhaps in the 
form of a lack of information, perhaps in the form of some kind of 
behavioral bias. The considerations that might justify a refusal to 
respect the choice not to choose are essentially identical to the 
considerations that would justify a refusal to respect any other 
choice—with an additional factor, involving the importance of 
learning and of developing one’s preferences. 
We shall see that there are several strong arguments in favor of 
active choosing, but there is also a tempting response that falls 
somewhat short. The argument is that in many contexts, people 
affirmatively like to choose, and active choosing is desirable for that 
reason. The premise is certainly correct. Sometimes people do prefer 
to choose, and indeed they would retain their authority to choose 
even if delegation would be in their material interest.102 This point 
argues strongly against coercion in the form of mandates and bans. 
But it is not clearly an objection to the use of default rules. If such 
rules are in place, people retain freedom of choice, and they can 
reject the default. True, it may be best to ask active choosers whether 
they want to use a default, rather than simply to establish a default—
but in either case, people are free to choose.103 The strongest 
arguments on behalf of active choosing lie elsewhere. 
1. Learning.   
a. The Basic Problem.  As we have seen, active choosing 
promotes learning and thus the development of preferences. Mill 
made the central point, emphasizing that “the free development of 
individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being” and indeed 
“that it is not only a co-ordinate element with all that is designated by 
the terms civilization, instruction, education, culture, but is itself a 
necessary part and condition of all those things.”104 Mill noted that 
conformity to custom 
 
 102. See Ernst Fehr et al., supra note 24, at 1326 (“Our first main result is that the principals 
show a proclivity for retaining authority in situations in which they could improve their expected 
income by delegating it, i.e., in situations in which their return from the agent’s preferred 
project is relatively high.”). 
 103. For some cautionary notes emphasizing the power of defaults, see Rebonato, supra 
note 1, at 359–60 (emphasizing the stickiness of defaults and exploring the effective default 
option behind the massive difference between Austrians and Germans in organ donation rates).  
 104. MILL, supra note 51, at 102. 
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does not educate or develop . . . any of the qualities which are the 
distinctive endowment of a human being. The human faculties of 
perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, are 
exercised only in making a choice . . . .  The mental and moral, like 
the muscular powers, are improved only by being  used.105 
There is strong evidence that Mill was right. Libertarian 
paternalists often refer to the GPS navigation system as a prime 
nudge,106 because it helps people to find the right route while also 
allowing them to go their own way. But there is a downside, which is 
that use of the GPS can make it harder for people to learn how to 
navigate the roads. Indeed, London taxi drivers, not relying on the 
GPS, have been found to experience an alteration of their brain 
functions as they learn more about navigation, with physical changes 
in certain regions of the brain.107 As the GPS becomes widespread, 
that kind of alteration will not occur, thus ensuring that people cannot 
navigate on their own. This is an unusually dramatic finding, to be 
sure, but it raises the possibility that whenever people rely on defaults 
or on other nudges, rather than on their own active choices, some 
important capacities may atrophy or fail to develop entirely.108 This is 
the antidevelopmental consequence of some helpful nudges, including 
the GPS itself. If the brain is seen as a muscle, it can become weak or 
strong, and choice-making is a kind of exercise that may strengthen it. 
Choosers may themselves favor active choosing, and reject 
defaults, for exactly these reasons. They might want to develop their 
own faculties. For their part, choice architects might know that a 
certain outcome is in the interest of most people, but they might also 
believe that it is independently important for people to learn about 
the underlying questions, so that they can use the “stock” of what 
they learn to make choices in multiple areas in the future. In the 
context of financial decisions, it may be valuable for people to 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Richard H. Thaler & Will Tucker, Smarter Information, Smarter Consumers, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2013, at 46–47 (discussing the transformative effects by GPS on 
people’s lives). 
 107. Eleanor A. Maguire, David G. Gadian, Ingrid S. Johnsrude, Catriona D. Good, John 
Ashburner, Richard S.J. Frackowiak & Christopher D. Frith, Navigation-Related Structural 
Changes in the Hippocampi of Taxi Drivers, 97 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 4398, 4399 (2000) 
(finding a difference of hippocampus’ volume between London taxi drivers and the control 
subjects who did not drive taxis). 
 108. See Rebonato, supra note 1, at 388–89 (arguing the connection between the failure to 
exercise critical senses and the degradation of brain’s capacity to reason rationally and 
critically). 
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develop the kinds of understandings that will enable them to choose 
well for themselves. The same point holds for decisions relating to 
health care. With respect to health insurance, choosers may wish to 
choose, not because they enjoy the process, but because they would 
like to learn, and perhaps choice architects also believe that this 
experience would be a good idea. And while doctors might be 
tempted to choose some kind of default rule in difficult cases, and to 
suggest that patients ought to rely on it, they might reject that 
approach in favor of a strong presumption of patient autonomy, 
offering information but asking for an active choice, in part so that 
patients learn. 
The point is not to suggest any particular judgment about these 
examples. Choice-making can strengthen our muscles, but it can also 
deplete them, leaving them with insufficient bandwidth for what 
matters most.109 We should not mourn the fact that with the advent of 
the printed page, people are no longer able to memorize large blocks 
of text.110 Even if a failure to choose has an adverse effect on learning, 
it might well turn out that on balance, the justification for active 
choosing is unconvincing. But we could easily imagine a kind of 
science-fiction tale, depicting a Brave New World in which people are 
defaulted into a large number of good outcomes, or even choose to be 
so defaulted, but are deprived of agency and learning despite being 
made more comfortable. In the words of the novelist Aldous Huxley: 
“A really efficient totalitarian state would be one in which the all-
powerful executive of political bosses and their army of managers 
control a population of slaves who do not have to be coerced, because 
they love their servitude.”111 If some people fear that default rules 
threaten to infantilize them, the underlying concern lies here. 
Consider the pleas of Huxley’s hero, the Savage, surrounded by a 
world of comfortable defaults: “But I don’t want comfort. I want 
God, I want poetry, I want real danger, I want freedom, I want 
goodness. I want sin.”112 Or consider this passage: 
  “All right then,” said the Savage defiantly, “I’m claiming the 
right to be unhappy.” 
 
 109. See MULLAINATHAN & SHAFIR, supra note 11, at 162 (emphasizing the importance of 
bandwidth limits). 
 110. I am grateful to Lauren Willis for this example. 
 111. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD xvii (1932). 
 112. Id. at 163. 
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  “Not to mention the right to grow old and ugly and impotent; the 
right to have syphilis and cancer; the right to have too little to eat; 
the right to be lousy; the right to live in constant apprehension of 
what may happen to-morrow; the right to catch typhoid; the right to 
be tortured by unspeakable pains of every kind.” There was a long 
silence. 
  “I claim them all,” said the Savage at last.113 
Such objections should not be romanticized (as Huxley tended 
to) or overstated. Syphilis and cancer, typhoid and torture, and 
having too little to eat are likely to be “claimed” by those who have 
never suffered from those things. Nonetheless, there are important 
domains in which learning is important and active choosing is 
necessary to promote it. Here, then, is an enduring argument for 
choice-making and for choice-requiring paternalism.114 
b. Self-Narrowing.  The risk of self-narrowing raises concerns 
about any approach that defaults people into certain outcomes on the 
basis of their own past choices. Suppose, for example, that a political 
system defaulted people into voting for political candidates of the 
same party for which they previously voted (subject to the right to opt 
out). Such a system would unquestionably reduce the burdens of 
voting, simply because people’s preferences would be registered 
automatically. We might well think that for many voters, that system 
would be highly desirable, because it would reduce the costs of 
decisions without much increasing the costs of errors. But there is a 
strong argument that it would be inconsistent with a defining goal of a 
democratic system, which is to ensure continuing learning and 
scrutiny by voters. 
If that goal is taken seriously, we should object not only to 
“default voting,” based on people’s past choices, but also to a system 
in which people actively choose to enroll in default voting, because 
the objectives of learning and continuing scrutiny forbid even active 
enrollment in default voting. If citizens could enroll in default voting, 
the registration of their preferences and values would, in a sense, be 
 
 113. Id.  
 114. Rebonato, supra note 1, at 392 (“Indeed, given the incessant drumming by the 
behavioural economists and the libertarian paternalists about how bad we are at making 
choices, it would not be surprising if theirs became a self-fulfilling prophecy. And when these 
conclusions about human nature are reached, liberalism becomes a rather vacuous concept, and 
loses the enriching and capability-enhancing features it has possessed at the very least since the 
work of Mill.”). 
SUNSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2014  1:40 PM 
34 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1 
too automatic, because it would not reflect any kind of active, current 
judgment about candidates and issues. As a preliminary test of 
people’s reactions to this topic, I conducted a small experiment at a 
large university, asking about seventy students (in law, business, and 
public policy) the following question: 
  You live in a state that is considering a system of “default voting,” 
in accordance with which people could set up party-line votes in 
advance. In this system, they could go online, at any time, to 
partyvote.gov, and say that they want to vote for all Republicans or all 
Democrats in the coming election. What do you think of this idea? 
(Assume the site is completely secure.)115 
A strong majority (79 percent) disapproved of the idea. 
Interestingly, over one-fifth approved of it, apparently on the ground 
that it would increase convenience. But the widespread disapproval 
testifies to a norm in favor of a more active form of participation. I 
also asked a different group of people, recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, the same question, and here the numbers were 
essentially identical, with 78 percent (of fifty participants) rejecting 
that system. It is possible that such disapproval merely suggests a 
prevailing social norm, which could be changed as technology 
evolves. But the norm might well be taken to suggest a defensible 
social judgment in favor of relatively active engagement in choosing 
among candidates. 
Or consider the website Pandora, which allows users to identify a 
favorite song or singer, and which devises a kind of default music 
station on the basis of that choice. The website has many virtues, and 
it is a lot of fun, but there is a risk to learning and self-development in 
any situation in which people are defaulted into a kind of echo 
chamber, even if they themselves took the initial step to devise it.116 
The same might be said about Netflix, which does not exactly use 
defaults (in the sense of playing music or movies even when one does 
nothing), but which assembles a set of suggestions, based on users’ 
previous choices (and evaluations). Netflix’s kind of fine-tuning, 
which allows a great deal of precision in the resulting suggestions, 
obviously produces large welfare benefits, because people see what 
they are highly likely to enjoy (and can choose it—actively, not by 
 
 115. The results of this survey are on file with the Duke Law Journal. 
 116. For an extended argument to this effect, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
REPUBLIC.COM (2001). 
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default). The question is whether the welfare benefits come at a cost, 
in the form of inevitable self-narrowing, simply because the relevant 
suggestions are based on previous choices, and do not encourage 
people to branch out. 
A great city combats such narrowing, because of the dazzling 
range of serendipitous encounters that it promotes.117 In a sense, it 
allows people to choose not to choose—and what they do not choose 
surprises and enriches them. There is a large difference between an 
architecture of control, based on past choices, and an architecture of 
serendipity, in which one stumbles on new topics, perspectives, and 
things. It could well be argued that an architecture of serendipity is 
more compatible with self-development and (along an important 
dimension) liberty itself. 
c. An Objection.  Let us step back from the particular examples 
and notice that there is a formidable objection to the learning-based 
argument for active choosing. The objection is that people do and 
should learn about whether to choose actively or instead to choose not 
to choose.118 People sometimes decide correctly, and sometimes they 
err, in making that particular choice, as in making all other choices. It 
is important for them to learn, over time, when they should be 
choosing and when they should instead be relying on a default rule 
(and accepting the force of inertia or the power of suggestion119). That 
form of second-order learning is exceedingly important. The problem 
is that those who insist on active choosing, or even favor it, will 
reduce or prevent learning along this important dimension. Claiming 
to promote learning and the development of values and preferences, 
they truncate such learning and such development about an 
extremely important set of questions. 
In light of this objection, the argument from learning must be 
more refined. The argument must be that in particular cases, it is 
especially important that people engage in first-order rather than 
second-order learning, because the subject is one for which they 
should accumulate some kind of “capital.” For example, it may be 
 
 117. See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 
(1961). 
 118. I am grateful to Adrian Vermeule for pressing this point. 
 119. See N. Craig Smith, Daniel G. Goldstein & Eric J. Johnson, Choice Without Awareness: 
Ethical and Policy Implications of Defaults, 32 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 159, 161 (2013) 
(urging that consumers may perceive defaults set by marketers as suggestions and as obvious 
attempts to manipulate). 
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especially important that people learn about what they actually like 
(in terms of, say, politics, art, or music) or develop an understanding 
of certain matters that very much affect how their lives will unfold 
over time (in terms of, say, health insurance or investments). In some 
such cases, the argument for active choosing may be convincing—
perhaps because people are subject to inertia or a form of myopia 
that leads them to favor a default. Nonetheless, it must be 
acknowledged that second-order learning might therefore be 
compromised. 
2. Overcoming Error-Prone or Ill-Motivated Choice Architects.  
When choice architects lack relevant information, so that the chosen 
default rule might be harmful to some or many, there are significant 
advantages to active choosing (and choosers might appreciate that 
fact). Suppose that a private institution is producing the default, and 
it really does not know a great deal about what informed people 
would choose. In the context of ice-cream flavors, tablets, cell phones, 
and sneakers, people tend to know what they like, and while advice 
might be welcome, active choosing is far better than an impersonal 
default rule. The same is true for many activities and goods provided 
by private institutions. Market pressures can lead such institutions to 
a good mix of default rules and active choosing, fitting the desires of 
diverse customers. 
Or suppose that the government is producing the default rule. If 
public officials are biased or inadequately informed, and if the default 
rule is no better than a guess, that rule might lead people in the wrong 
direction. Followers of Friedrich Hayek,120 emphasizing “the 
knowledge problem,” claim that public officials will inevitably know 
less than market participants do.121 An appreciation of the knowledge 
problem might well argue in favor of active choosing. The same point 
argues against a default rule, and in favor of active choosing, when 
self-interested private groups are calling for the government to select 
a default rule even though it would not benefit those on whom it is 
imposed. Active choosing is much less risky on these counts. If 
choosers do not trust public officials—because those officials do not 
know everything, or because their motivations may not be pure—they 
 
 120. See generally Hayek, supra note 5. 
 121. See, e.g., L. Lynne Kiesling, Knowledge Problem (Oxford Encyclopedia of Austrian 
Economics, Working Paper, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2001633. 
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might like active choosing best, and have no interest in choosing not 
to choose.122 
3. Handling Changes Over Time.  Choosers might be aware that 
default rules are usually static, and if situations change over time, 
such rules might be suboptimal even if they were sensible when 
originally imposed.123 By contrast, active choosing could be designed 
in such a way as to require periodic revelation of choosers’ 
preferences. In markets, dynamism is essentially guaranteed. People 
purchase goods and services as they want or need them, and as they 
develop new tastes (for soap, sneakers, or cell phones, for example), 
those new tastes will be registered at the time of purchase. 
In theory, of course, default rules could also change over time. 
An all-knowing choice architect could project how tastes are likely to 
evolve, perhaps by generalizing from the behavior of large 
populations. We might know, for example, that young people are 
likely to select certain retirement plans and that older people tend to 
select very different plans. But in practice, and outside the context of 
a few relatively clear cases, it might not be easy to produce accurate 
projections. It is possible that with increasing technological capacities 
and the emergence of large data sets, this challenge will eventually (or 
soon) be surmounted. But even if this is so, data-driven default rules 
might less accurately reflect choosers’ situations than would active 
choosing. Choosers themselves might choose to run the risk of 
inaccuracy, especially if they are not much interested in the area at 
hand, or if the stakes are relatively low.124 But in many cases, the 
possibility of changes over time argues strongly in favor of active 
choosing. 
4. Heterogeneity.  Active choosing appropriately handles 
diversity. As compared with either a system of opting in or one of 
opting out, active choosing can have major advantages when the 
relevant group is heterogeneous, because a single approach is unlikely 
to fit diverse circumstances. If one size does not fit all for health 
insurance or savings, then choice architects might want to ensure that 
people make choices on their own. For this reason, active choosing 
 
 122. See Rebonato, supra note 1, at 389–90. 
 123. See James Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian & Andrew Metrick, Defined 
Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Choices, and the Path of Least Resistance, in TAX 
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (James Poterba ed., 2002). 
 124. See generally Ullmann-Margalit & Morgenbesser, supra note 31. 
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may be far better. In the face of diversity, a default rule might be 
especially harmful, because the power of inertia, or the force of 
suggestion, may mean that many people will end up in a situation that 
is not in their interest. People might be far better off if they are asked, 
“What health-insurance plan do you like best?” than if they are 
automatically enrolled in a plan chosen by their employer. 
True, freedom of choice, in the form of the ability to opt out, is 
an important safeguard against the problem of one-size-fits-all. But 
because of the effects of inertia and the power of suggestion, some 
people will stick with a default even when it does not fit their 
situation. Importantly, a personalized default rule, designed to fit 
people’s diverse situations, might reduce the problem of 
heterogeneity. But design of personalized defaults can present serious 
challenges of its own, especially when the choice architect has limited 
information.125 
5. Overcoming Inertia.  Because active choosing requires an 
affirmative decision, it overcomes inertia in a way that a default rule 
will not.126 Suppose that inertia and procrastination lead people not to 
give serious consideration to the possibility that a default rule is not in 
their interest. If so, active choosing may be an excellent corrective, 
even if it is mandatory. Such choosing requires people to incur effort 
costs that might otherwise lead them to focus on other matters. 
Consider savings plans, health insurance, and privacy settings. The 
problem with an opt-in default rule is that it will likely ensure that 
some people end up with outcomes that they would not select if they 
were to make a choice. A key virtue of active choosing is that it 
increases the likelihood that people will end up with their desired 
outcomes. For this reason, choice architects might favor it. 
 
 125. See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 48–52, 54 (“While such defaults do not have all of the 
advantages of actual choice, they have many of them, and at the same time they promise to 
overcome most of the problems associated with impersonal defaults. Above all, they can handle 
the problem of heterogeneity, and thus accurately reflect preferences, without imposing the 
burdens and costs associated with active choosing.”); Sunstein & Reisch, supra note 20, at 23 
(“Personalized defaults draw on available information about which approach is sought by, or 
best suits, different groups of people, and potentially each individual person, in the relevant 
population.”). On an intriguing negative reaction to personalized offers, see Aner Sela, Itamar 
Simonson & Ran Kivetz, Beating the Market: The Allure of Unintended Value, 50 J. 
MARKETING RES. 691, 691–92 (2013) (finding that consumers see customized offers, tailored to 
individual circumstances, as less valuable than offers that seem to fit their preferences without 
the marketer’s specific intent). 
 126. See Keller et al., supra note 82. 
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B. Against Active Choosing (and for Not Choosing) 
1. Which Track?  Notwithstanding its potential benefits, active 
choosing could also create serious problems. It is hardly the right 
approach in all situations. Often people benefit from not choosing. To 
see why, consider the words of Esther Duflo, one of the world’s 
leading experts on poverty: 
[W]e tend to be patronizing about the poor in a very specific sense, 
which is that we tend to think, “Why don’t they take more 
responsibility for their lives?” And what we are forgetting is that the 
richer you are the less responsibility you need to take for your own 
life because everything is taken care [of] for you. And the poorer 
you are the more you have to be responsible for everything about 
your life. . . . [S]top berating people for not being responsible and 
start to think of ways instead of providing the poor with the luxury 
that we all have, which is that a lot of decisions are taken for us. If 
we do nothing, we are on the right track. For most of the poor, if 
they do nothing, they are on the wrong track.127 
Duflo’s central claim is that people who are well off do not have 
to be responsible for a wide range of things, because others are 
making the relevant decisions, and for their benefit. In countless 
domains, choices are in fact “taken for us,” and such steps not only 
increase our welfare but also promote our autonomy, because we are 
freed up to spend our time on other matters.128 In ordinary life, most 
people in developed countries do not have to decide how and 
whether to make water safe to drink or air safe to breathe; we do not 
have to decide whether to build roads and refrigerators and airplanes; 
the Constitution settles the basic structure of the federal government, 
and we revisit that structure rarely if at all; the alphabet is given to us, 
not chosen by us. It is true and important that we may participate in 
numerous decisions through politics and markets. But often we rely 
on the fact that choices are made by others, and we go about our 
business without troubling ourselves about them. This is a blessing, 
not a curse. 
 
 127. Susan Parker, Esther Duflo Explains Why She Believes Randomized Controlled Trials 
Are So Vital, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PHILANTHROPY (June 23, 2011) (third alteration in original), 
http://www.effectivephilanthropy.org/esther-duflo-explains-why-she-believes-randomized-
controlled-trials-are-so-vital. 
 128. See generally MULLAINATHAN & SHAFIR, supra note 11. 
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2. Burdens on Choosers.  These points suggest a serious problem 
with active choosing, which is that it can impose large burdens on 
choosers. Many people do not or would not welcome those burdens. 
Suppose that the situation is unfamiliar and complicated. Suppose 
that people lack information or experience. If so, active choosing may 
impose unjustified or excessive costs on people; it might produce 
frustration and appear to require pointless red tape. Most consumers 
would not much like it if, at the time of purchase, they had to choose 
every feature of their cell-phone plan or all of their computer’s initial 
settings. The existence of defaults saves people a lot of time, and most 
defaults may well be sensible and suitable. Few consumers would like 
to spend the time required to obtain relevant information and to 
decide what choice to make. As compared with a default rule, active 
choosing increases the costs of decisions, sometimes significantly. In 
the process, active choosing can strain people’s bandwidth and 
increase “decision fatigue,”129 thus creating problems for other, 
potentially more important decisions. 
3. Burdens on Providers.  At the same time, active choosing can 
impose large burdens on providers. In the abstract, choosers may not 
particularly care about those burdens, but they can end up having a 
range of adverse effects on choosers of all kinds. The basic point is 
that defaults can be desirable and even important for those who 
provide goods or services. It is true that providers have to incur costs 
to build a system of good default rules. But without a series of default 
rules, and with constant active choosing, significant resources might 
have to be devoted to patient, tedious explanations and to elaborating 
the various options with consumers or users, who might not welcome 
the exercise. For providers, the experience of selling a cell phone or a 
laptop might be horrific if active choosing were required for every 
product characteristic. We could easily imagine a bit of science 
fiction, or perhaps a situation comedy, that makes this point 
especially vivid. In a system of active choosing, valuing patient 
autonomy, doctors have to do a great deal of explaining. That cost 
might be worth incurring, but it can be significant. 
 
 129. See id.; Jonathan Levav, Mark Heitmann, Andreas Herrmann & Sheena S. Iyengar, 
Order in Product Customization Decisions: Evidence from Field Experiments, 118 J. POL. ECON. 
274, 287, 290 (2010). 
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4. Errors.  A final point, emphasized perhaps above all by those 
who prefer not to choose, is that active choosing can increase errors. 
The goal of active choosing is to make people better off by 
overcoming the potential mistakes of choice architects. But if the area 
is unfamiliar, highly technical, and confusing, active choosing might 
have the opposite effect. If consumers are required to answer a set of 
highly technical questions, and if the choice architects know what 
they are doing, then people will probably enjoy better outcomes with 
defaults. Perhaps it would be best to rely on experiments or pilot 
studies that elicit choices from informed people, and then to use those 
choices to build defaults. But if choice architects have technical 
expertise and are trustworthy, an exercise of that kind might not be 
worthwhile. 
5. A Brief Accounting.  It is time to venture a summary of the 
various considerations that might justify active choosing, or suggest 
instead that it is a big mistake. A simple framework, investigating the 
costs of decisions and the costs of errors, helps to explain when it 
make sense to choose, and when it makes sense to choose not to do 
so. That framework clarifies the decisions of choice architects as well. 
To the extent that the area is unfamiliar and confusing, default 
rules are desirable, because they reduce both decision costs and error 
costs. But if choice architects are ignorant or biased, they will not be 
in a good position to devise accurate default rules, and hence active 
choosing seems best. To the extent that there is relevant 
heterogeneity within the population of choosers, active choosing has 
significant advantages, because it diminishes error costs. To the 
extent that preferences and situations change over time, there is a 
strong argument for active choosing, at least if any default rule may 
well become anachronistic. The value of learning, and of 
development of tastes and preferences, may well argue on behalf of 
active choosing as well—a general theme that has run throughout the 
discussion and that argues against choosing not to choose. 
In view of these considerations, a promising approach is often to 
ask people to make an active choice, but to inform them that they can 
rely on a default rule if they like. Under this approach, active choice 
is essentially the default, but people can reject it. Sometimes this 
approach minimizes decision costs and error costs, and it can also be 
seen to protect people’s autonomy as well (as a default rule, standing 
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by itself, might not130). These points should not be taken to suggest 
that active choosing, with a default-rule alternative, is the right 
approach for all times and places. Sometimes a simple default rule is 
better. But active choosing with a default is often worth careful 
consideration, at least where the decision costs of the process are not 
high, and when it provides a safeguard against errors. 
To these points we can add two others. The first is that people 
might not have any kind of preference in advance. If they lack a 
preference, they might simply “pick,”131 and it is not clear why that 
would be desirable. If people are forced to develop a preference, the 
question is whether it is worthwhile for them to develop one, a 
question that requires (again) analysis of decision costs and error 
costs. An additional point is that active choosing itself requires some 
form of choice architecture, and neutrality is not so easy to achieve. 
Small differences in presentation may affect what people end up 
selecting. This point does not count against active choosing, but it 
suggests the importance of close attention to design, especially if the 
goal is to elicit what people actually want, or to ask them to figure 
that out on their own. 
C. Third Parties 
Throughout the discussion, I have assumed that the welfare of 
choosers is all that is at stake, and that the choice between active 
choosing and a default rule is best assessed by reference to choosers’ 
welfare. In some cases, however, the interests of third parties are very 
much at stake. Those interests may complicate the analysis in two 
different ways. Above all, a focus on the interests of third parties 
suggests some reasons to favor a default rule over active choosing, at 
least if the default rule protects third parties, and if active choosers 
might not attend to their interests. 
1. Externalities.  The first complication involves externalities. 
Return to the organ-donation example. A choice architect might 
conclude that if the welfare of choosers is all that matters, active 
 
 130. Rebonato, supra note 1, at 370–71. 
 131. See Ullmann-Margalit & Morgenbesser, supra note 31, at 762–65 (“[A]s far as the 
ordinary consumer in the ordinary shopping situation is concerned one cannot seize upon these 
possible differences and claim that owing to them the situation is one of choosing. For all that 
the ordinary consumer in the ordinary shopping situation can determine for himself in a rough-
and-ready way the alternatives up for selection are essentially identical and so his situation vis-
à-vis them is one of picking.”). 
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choosing is the best approach, or perhaps active choosing with an 
option to select the default rule. But suppose that with this approach, 
hundreds or even thousands of lives will be lost that would otherwise 
be saved with a pro-donation default rule.132 If so, the choice architect 
might give serious consideration to that default rule, even if the case 
for active choosing would otherwise be quite strong.133 
Or consider the case of energy suppliers. Suppose that from the 
standpoint of the consumer, the best approach is to require active 
choosing among various providers, on the ground that different 
options (involving varying costs and varying environmental effects) 
will suit different people’s values and situations. But suppose as well 
that greener energy sources would reduce significant environmental 
harms. If so, the argument for green defaults might be 
overwhelming.134 
It is true that in both cases, and in others in which externalities 
are involved, a mandate or ban might be justified or required, 
because it would maximize net benefits. If the externalities are large, 
we have a standard market failure, calling for regulation that goes 
well beyond a default rule. But suppose that the externalities are not 
entirely clear, or that the obligations of choosers are complex and 
contested (as in the organ-donor case), or that there are political 
obstacles to the use of mandates or bans. If so, a default rule, 
designed to address the likely externalities, might well be preferable 
to active choosing. 
2. Psychology, Responsibility, and Choice.  The second 
complication involves the potentially profound psychological 
differences between active choosing and defaults, and the effects of 
those differences on other people. Active choosing offers distinctive 
signals and has a distinctive meaning. With an active choice, the 
chooser takes full responsibility, and his intended decision is 
 
 132. Eric Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCI. 1338, 1339 (2003). 
Note that the area is especially challenging, in part because many people have moral qualms 
about a pro-donation default (“presumed consent”) and in part because such a default might 
not be effective. Family members, who have the authority to choose at the time of decision, 
might not trust a passive decision, produced by the default, as reflecting the wishes of the person 
whose body parts are involved. 
 133. For an instructive discussion, see Kessler & Roth, supra note 17 (exploring ways to 
promote organ donation and finding that required choosing is less effective than prompted 
choice). 
 134. See generally Sunstein & Reisch, supra note 20. 
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unambiguous, at least along a potentially relevant dimension.135 With 
a default rule, by contrast, both responsibility136 and intention can be 
murkier. We might not quite know what the chooser wants, because 
inertia and inattention might be responsible for his apparent decision. 
This difference matters. 
Suppose, for example, that someone is defaulted into being an 
organ donor, or into a “no heroic measures” approach toward 
extension of his own life. In such circumstances, a responsible family 
member might well hesitate before honoring the relevant “choices,” 
for exactly the same reasons that mandate the use of quotation marks 
around that word. If what is sought is a clear expression of the 
chooser’s actual will, and if other people will not regard any apparent 
decision as authentic without such an expression, then there is a 
strong argument for active choosing—and hence for choice-requiring 
paternalism. 
Consider in this regard the phenomenon of “choice bias,” which 
means that people show a strong preference for options that they 
have actually chosen over equally good options that did not come to 
them as a result of free choice.137 We are used to thinking that our 
preferences shape our choices, but our choices also turn out to shape 
our preferences. We may choose what we like, but we also like what 
we choose.138 This point has implications for thinking about the 
differences between active and passive choices. If people have made 
an active choice, they are more likely to become invested in it, and in 
a sense to like it. These same effects may not occur when the choice 
has been made passively and by default. 
 
 135. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which operate as defaults and are not mandatory, 
are an interesting example. It would be useful to study the guidelines in psychological terms, 
emphasizing how the issue of responsibility works in practice. 
 136. See Bartling & Fischbacher, supra note 12, at 68. The authors find:  
If the dictator delegates the decision right and the delegee makes the unfair choice, 
then mainly the delegee is punished, while the dictator is almost spared. . . . By 
conducting treatments with and without punishment opportunities of the receivers, 
the experimental design allows to test whether the avoidance of punishment is indeed 
a motive for the delegation of a decision right. This is strongly confirmed as the share 
of delegated decisions is three times higher in the treatment with punishment than in 
the treatment without punishment opportunities. 
Id. at 69. 
 137. See Jeffrey Cockburn, Anne G.E. Collins & Michael J. Frank, A Reinforcement 
Learning Mechanism Responsible for the Valuation of Free Choice, 83 NEURON 551, 553 (2014). 
 138. See Tali Sharot, Cristina M. Velasquez & Raymond J. Dolan, Do Decisions Shape 
Preferences? Evidence from Blind Choice, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1231, 1233 (2010). 
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Imagine that the goal is to promote healthy behavior, or to 
increase the likelihood that people will act in ways that promote the 
public interest (for example, by reducing pollution or threats of 
crime). If they make those choices actively, they are likely to be 
committed to them, and that commitment might have desirable 
spillover effects, perhaps by spurring other such decisions. But if 
people make those choices by default, their own preferences have 
been neither registered nor affected. These points may not be decisive 
in favor of active choosing, but they do suggest a potential downside 
to defaults. 
There are associated questions of guilt and regret, and these may 
argue either for or against active choosing. Suppose that a family 
member is deciding whether to take heroic measures to extend the 
life of someone she loves. If choice architects—the government, the 
medical profession, a hospital—require the family member to make 
an active choice, her responsibility is clear; it is hers alone. If, by 
contrast, a default rule goes one way or the other, the chooser can 
reasonably rely on or refer to it, diffusing her responsibility and also 
carrying a kind of authority that influences her choice. The family 
member might well appreciate such effects; she might not want to 
assume responsibility. 
At the same time, we can easily imagine settings in which it is 
important to place the responsibility fully in the chooser’s hands, 
partly to protect third parties, whole systems, or individuals 
themselves. Recall the case of voting, where a default rule would be 
objectionable in part because it intrudes on that responsibility. Where 
it is desirable to create a sense of responsibility, active choosing 
becomes more appealing. 
V.  PREDICTIVE PURCHASES? NOTES ON “BIG DATA” 
A. “The Chief Basis of the Argument for Liberty”? 
We have seen that in free markets, people do not obtain goods 
and services unless they choose them. In that domain, active choosing 
is the rule. As a general rule, we do not own things by default, 
whether they are cell phones, sneakers, soap, tennis racquets, or 
automobiles. 
But why, exactly, is this so? Why is active choosing required? An 
obvious answer is that unless people have actually said that they want 
some good or service, we cannot know what they want and whether 
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and when they want it. No planner can possibly have the requisite 
knowledge.139 Active choosing and the resulting freedom are, on this 
view, indispensable welfarist safeguards against error, understood as 
mistaken judgments about what people want. If, for example, a 
bookseller presumed that a consumer wanted certain books, and 
defaulted them into ownership (subject to the right to opt out), there 
would be an undue risk that people would end up with books that 
they do not want. By requiring active choosing in ordinary markets, 
we minimize the sum of decision costs and error costs. Recall Hayek’s 
remarkable suggestion that “the awareness of our irremediable 
ignorance of most of what is known to somebody [who is a planner] is 
the chief basis of the argument for liberty.”140 
One understanding of this suggestion is that active choosing is 
necessary to protect autonomy,141 not welfare, because without some 
affirmative statement of intention, people should not find themselves 
forced (or assumed) to purchase goods or services. But the welfarist 
account itself seems especially straightforward. Some people might 
think that the autonomy argument is a shorthand way of capturing 
that account, and not in any way independent—a point to which I will 
return. 
B. Experiments 
To test these claims, let us consider a thought experiment in 
which sellers know, with perfect or near-perfect certainty, what 
people would want to buy. Suppose that “big data,” understood as 
immense data sets about people’s past decisions,142 helps to ensure 
that level of accuracy.143 Suppose that on the basis of such decisions, a 
bookseller knows what people will buy before they know themselves. 
If so, the welfarist conclusion seems clear: people should be defaulted 
into those purchases. 
The reason is that this approach reduces (and even eliminates) 
decision costs144 and, by hypothesis, has zero or near-zero error costs. 
 
 139. See Hayek, supra note 50, at 386.  
 140. See id. (emphasis added). 
 141. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 386 (1981). 
 142. For relevant discussion, see generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH 
CUKIER, BIG DATA (2013); JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU (2011). 
 143. See Bensinger, supra note 37 (“Based on all the things [Amazon] know[s] about their 
customers they could predict demand based on a variety of factors.”). 
 144. A qualification would be necessary if people actually enjoy making the relevant 
decisions, so that the relevant process creates benefits rather than imposing costs. 
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It is tempting to think that such defaults, leading to a form of 
“predictive shopping” or “as-if shopping,” are also unacceptable from 
the standpoint of autonomy, but the temptation should be resisted. 
We are speaking of cases in which we know, with perfect or near-
perfect certainty, what people want. From the standpoint of 
autonomy, what is the problem? In such cases, it might well seem that 
rational people would choose not to choose, because the default 
serves them perfectly well. It gives them what they want, without 
requiring them to take the necessary steps to obtain it. To test 
reactions to this question, I asked about seventy university students 
the following question: 
  Suppose that over the years, your favorite online bookseller has 
compiled a great deal of information about your preferences. It thinks 
it knows what you want before you do. Would you approve or 
disapprove if the seller decides in favor of “default purchases,” by 
which it sends you books that it knows you will purchase, and bills 
you (though you can send the books back if you don’t want them)? 
(Assume that the relevant algorithm is highly reliable—accurate in at 
least 99 percent of cases—though not completely unerring.)145 
Notably, 84 percent disapproved. Perhaps the problem is that the 
bookseller is enrolling people automatically, without their consent. 
But significantly, a large majority—70 percent—would also decline to 
sign up for such a system. With a different population, recruited from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk, the results were broadly similar. Of fifty 
people, 86 percent rejected default purchases and 84 percent would 
decline to sign up. 
These results might seem puzzling. At first glance, the most 
serious problems with predictive shopping (and with the resulting 
defaults) involve accuracy, but the question stipulated a high level of 
accuracy. How can the survey results be explained? Perhaps the 
participants did not believe the stipulation. In the real world, of 
course, there is a risk that those who use the relevant algorithms will 
be self-serving. They want to sell their products, and they might 
assume a desire to purchase even when people lack, or would not 
form, that desire. To be sure, markets will discipline errors of this 
kind, and people should be able to return products that they do not 
want. But because inertia can be so powerful, many people will 
 
Decisionmaking can be a benefit and not a cost, as for example when it is fun to choose among 
relevant options. 
 145.  The results of this survey are on file with the Duke Law Journal. 
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inevitably retain unwanted products.146 It is also true that in the 
context of book-buying, many people affirmatively enjoy the 
opportunity to browse options, to find out what has arrived, and to 
choose accordingly. 
In addition, and more fundamentally, people’s preferences 
change over time, certainly with respect to books. What people want 
this month might be quite different from what they want next month 
and the month after. They might like Stephen King novels in January, 
but find them uninteresting in June. Predictive purchases will have an 
exceedingly difficult time capturing such changes. Even if the 
algorithms are extraordinarily good, they must extrapolate from the 
past, and that extrapolation might be hazardous. 
It is of course an empirical question, not a conceptual one, 
whether and to what extent changing preferences would confound 
predictive shopping. Perhaps the relevant predictions would be 
perfectly accurate, or nearly so, across certain domains. With respect 
to certain household items—soap, toothpaste, toilet paper—
preferences do not change much, and well-timed automatic purchases 
could be a great boon. Imagine a kind of household manager that 
would automatically supply, at a charge, certain products as soon as 
people run out. What would be wrong with that? I asked about 
seventy university students the following question: 
  Assume that at some point in the future, homes can be monitored 
so as to “know” when you run out of various goods, such as soap, 
paper towels, and toilet paper. Would you approve of a system in 
which the home monitor automatically buys such goods for you, once 
you run out?147 
A strong majority—69 percent—did indeed approve. It is 
noteworthy that as compared to books, people’s negative reactions to 
predictive shopping flip when household items are involved. One 
reason may be that tastes are relatively static and so errors are 
unlikely. And unlike in the context of book-buying, where the process 
of search can be interesting and fun, most people would not consider 
it a benefit to choose among items of this kind. In the event of some 
kind of error, people might not much mind the idea of having extra 
soap, paper towels, and toilet paper. Compare automatic renewal of 
 
 146. Robert Letzler & Joshua Tasoff, Everyone Believes in Redemption: Nudges and 
Overoptimism in Costly Task Completion (Feb. 19, 2013) (unpublished working paper) 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2066930). 
 147.  The results of this survey are on file with the Duke Law Journal. 
SUNSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2014  1:40 PM 
2014] CHOOSING NOT TO CHOOSE 49 
newspapers or magazine subscriptions, which many people 
appreciate. 
Notably, a different population, recruited on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, did not approve of automatic shopping. In a group 
of fifty people, only 38 percent were in favor. Perhaps the reason was 
skepticism about the neutrality and accuracy of the home-monitoring 
system. Perhaps the relevant population feared that the monitor 
would buy goods that people did not want or need. Skepticism about 
choice architects, or about household monitors, can lead people in the 
direction of active choosing, even if choosing is not exactly fun. 
I followed these surveys with a more formal one that involved a 
nationally representative sample of just under five hundred 
respondents.148 The questions were similar to those in the surveys just 
reported, with some changes for clarity. The set-up was this:  
  Suppose that over the years, your favorite online bookseller has 
compiled a great deal of information about your preferences. On the 
basis of a new algorithm, it thinks it knows what you will want to buy 
before you do. Assume that the relevant algorithm is highly reliable—
accurate in more than 99 percent of cases, in the sense that it chooses 
to send people books that they will, in fact, want to buy. 
Here is the first question: 
  Would you choose to enroll in a program in which the seller sends 
you books that it knows you will purchase, and bills your credit card? 
(Assume that you can send the books back, with a full refund, if you 
don’t want them, and that you can always say that you no longer want 
to participate in this program.) 
Forty-one percent of people said yes, and 59 percent said no. 
This result is noteworthy for two different reasons. First, most people 
want to make their own choices, and would decline to enroll (as in the 
other surveys). But 41 percent would sign up, a significantly higher 
number than in the other surveys. 
The second question asked about automatic sign-up: 
  Would you approve or disapprove if the seller automatically, and 
without your explicit consent, enrolls you in a program in which it 
sends you books that it knows you will purchase, and bills your credit 
card? (Assume that you can send the books back, with a full refund, if 
 
 148. The results of this survey are on file with the Duke Law Journal. 
SUNSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2014  1:40 PM 
50 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1 
you don’t want them, and that you can always say that you no longer 
want to participate in this program.) 
Twenty-nine percent said that they would approve, and 71 
percent said that they would disapprove. This is a statistically 
significant difference from the first question; it suggests that people 
would be more likely to sign up for a system of automatic purchases 
than to approve of a situation in which a seller signs them up without 
their explicit consent. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that 29 percent—
nearly a third—would approve. 
I also surveyed a nationally representative sample about routine 
purchases: 
  Would you approve or disapprove of a system in which the home 
monitor automatically, and without your explicit consent, buys such 
goods for you, once you run out, and bills your credit card? (Assume 
that you can send the goods back, with a full refund, if you don’t want 
them, and that you can always say that you no longer want to 
participate.) 
Only 38 percent would approve, whereas 62 percent would not. 
The responses did not greatly change when people were asked 
whether they would voluntarily enroll in a program of this kind: 
  Would you choose to enroll in a program in which the home 
monitor automatically buys such goods for you, once you run out, 
and bills your credit card? (Assume that you can send the goods back, 
with a full refund, if you don’t want them, and that you can always 
say that you no longer want to participate.) 
Only 32 percent would enroll, whereas 68 percent would not. 
Here, as elsewhere, the majority’s refusal to participate is worth 
underlining, especially because it is not a lot of fun to purchase the 
relevant good. Perhaps people did not trust those who run the 
program. But it is also worth underlining the fact that a significant 
minority (nearly two-fifths) would enroll. The difference is statistically 
significant. With a nationally representative sample, there was 
increased support for the program when participation was explicit 
rather than presumed. 
C. Solutions 
Let us put the survey results to one side. If the empirical problem 
posed by changing preferences could be solved, so that accuracy were 
not a problem, both welfare and autonomy might well be promoted 
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by predictive shopping, and by assuming that people would prefer it, 
and would choose not to choose. The principal qualification is that 
automatic enrollment in programs of this kind might not make sense 
where people affirmatively like to make selections. In many domains, 
this is an exceedingly important point. With books, part of the 
pleasure, for many people, is the experience of choice—the minutes 
or even hours spent looking over the alternatives and making 
selections. But in other contexts, that experience is not exactly fun or 
enjoyable, and it is best avoided if accuracy can be guaranteed. The 
most forceful objection is that in many domains, the empirical 
problem cannot be solved—at least not yet. 
In these circumstances, the appropriate solution seems simple. 
People should not be defaulted into a system of predictive shopping, 
but should instead be given an active choice about whether they want 
to enroll. Some algorithms might prove themselves over time, and 
some people might want to take their chances with them even if they 
have not yet proved their worth. A consumer might think, “I do not 
want to bother to shop; the seller knows me well enough to choose for 
me.” Other consumers might think, “I enjoy shopping; it is a benefit 
rather than a cost; and I don’t trust the seller.” With many goods and 
services, people should be making active choices about when they 
want to rely on defaults. 
CONCLUSION 
Choice can be either a great benefit, a kind of gift, or instead an 
immense burden, a kind of curse. In evaluating private and public 
institutions, and people’s diverse attitudes toward freedom of choice, 
it is crucially important to appreciate their frequent desire to choose 
and also their frequent antipathy toward choosing. If either is 
neglected, there is a risk that both low-level policy judgments and 
high-level theoretical claims will go badly wrong. 
Many people have insisted on an opposition between active 
choosing and paternalism, but in many contexts, the opposition is 
illusory, even a logical error. The reason is that some people choose 
not to choose, or would do so if they were asked. To be sure, the 
power to choose may well have intrinsic value, but people often 
exercise that power by delegating authority to others. Nanny states 
forbid people from choosing, but they also forbid people from 
choosing not to choose. If choice architects override that particular 
choice, they may well be acting paternalistically—at least if they are 
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motivated by the belief that active choosing is good, notwithstanding 
the fact that people reject that belief. Insistence on active choosing 
may simultaneously reduce people’s welfare and insult their 
autonomy. The same concerns that motivate objections to 
paternalism in general can be applied to paternalistic interferences 
with people’s choice not to choose. 
We have also seen that the argument for active choosing, or 
instead for some kind of default rule, depends largely on the costs of 
decisions and the costs of errors. Where people are relevantly 
heterogeneous,149 and where choice architects lack information or 
neutrality, active choosing has real advantages. But if a default rule is 
accurate, active choosing does not make a great deal of sense, at least 
when people remain free to go their own way if they see fit. When 
choice architects overlook this point, and nonetheless insist on active 
choosing, they might well be behaving paternalistically, and in a way 
that reduces both the welfare and the autonomy of those whom they 
are seeking to help. 
In such cases, choice-requiring paternalism should be avoided. 
The principal qualification—and it is an important one—is that such 
paternalism might be justified insofar as it operates in the interest of 
the free development of individuality. In some settings, it is important 
for people to learn and to develop their values and preferences. In 
such cases, an insistence on active choosing can be seen as a way of 
promoting learning and self-development. This qualification is 
important, but it should not deflect attention from the larger point. 
When people choose not to choose, it is paternalistic—potentially a 
diminution of their welfare and an insult to their autonomy—to 
refuse to honor their choice. 
 
 149. Recall that a personalized default rule can reduce the problem. See Sunstein, supra 
note 20, at 48–49 (“The key advantage of [personalized default] rules is that they are likely to be 
more fine-grained and thus beneficial than ‘mass’ default rules.”). 
